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Flowers: Flowers: What You See Is What You Get:

What You See Is What You Get: Applying
the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to
Prosecutors
Roberta K.Flowers*
Appearances to the mind are offour kinds. Things either are what
they appearto be; or they neither are, nor appearto be; or they
are, and do not appearto be; or they are not, and yet appearto be.
To hit the mark in all these cases is the wise man's task.'
I. INTRODUCTION
2
The appearance of justice has been deemed as important as justice itself.
Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[t]he appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality." 3 Others have theorized that legal and

* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. I would like to
thank Kim Johnson and Clancy Mendoza for their research assistance. I would also like
to thank the Florida Institute for Litigation Ethics at Stetson University, which sponsored
my project on Professionalism and the Criminal Prosecutor from which the ideas for this
article emerged.
1. Epictetus, The Discourses, in DISCOURSES AND ENCHIRIDION 1, 68 (Thomas
Wentworth Higginson trans., 1944).
2. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Wise observers have long understood that the appearance ofjustice is as
important as its reality."); see also Roberta K. Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A
'Difference' Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 491, 500 (1995)
(suggesting that a primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to increase the litigant's
perception of the fairness of the jury verdict); Jerold H. Israel, CornerstonesofJudicial
Process, KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1993, at 5, 20 (suggesting that "[t]he fact that
criminal justice procedures are fair is not sufficient: the procedures must also be
perceived as fair (and as fairly administered) by both its participants and the public");
Wallace D. Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure: The Law, Social Policy, and
PsychologicalResearch, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 13,
16 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) (observing that the rules of
evidence contribute not only to the reliability of evidence but also to the perceived
fairness of the trial, and noting that litigants are more likely to accept the outcome if they
believe the process was impartial); cf David A. Harris, The AppearanceofJustice: Court
TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understandingofthe CriminalJusticeSystem,
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786 (1993) (proposing that "[t]he appearance ofjustice, accurate
or not, may be more important than justice itself'); Patrick E. Longan, Civil TrialReform
and the Appearance of Fairness,79 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1995) (advocating
reforms in trial procedure with an eye toward the appearance of those procedures as fair).
3. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Cf Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance
ofjustice.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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political systems cannot function effectively without the support of the
governed, and that such support will only occur if a system is perceived as fair
and just.4 Professor Abramson suggests that "[w]ithout the appearance as well
as the fact ofjustice, respect for the law vanishes in a democracy." 5
The need for trust in government extends to the criminal justice system.6
"[B]oth the ability of courts to influence the structure of law and the ability of
the police and other government officials to enforce the law depend upon public
satisfaction with, confidence in, and trust of legal authorities."7 Therefore, the
appearance of fairness is an essential consideration in evaluating the quality of
any justice system.8
One could assume that public perception is most directly affected by the
outcome of encounters with the system. 9 However, several studies demonstrate
that perceived procedural fairness has a substantial effect on a participant's
assessment of the system.' 0 For example, one study of defendants charged with

4. See Longan, supra note 2, at 296-97; Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived
Injustice in Defendants' Evaluationsof Their CourtroomExperience, 18 L. & Soc'Y REV.
51,52 (1984).
5. Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L.
REv. 949, 962-63 (1996) (citations omitted).
6. See Israel, supra note 2, at 19-20 (noting that respecting the dignity of the
individual and maintaining the appearance of fairness helps to promote acceptance and
respect for the criminal justice system). Justice Kennedy observed that "[a] court's
judgments will be given no serious consideration, no examination at all, if the public is
not confident that its judges remain committed to neutral and principled rules for the
conduct of their office." Anthony M. Kennedy, JudicialEthics and the Rule ofLaw, 40
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1067, 1067 (1996).
7. Tyler, supra note 4, at 51 (citation omitted). One commentator observed that
"the appearance that the justice system distributes justice fairly has much to do with the
public's acceptance of the judicial system and the public's perception of its legitimacy."
Kerri L. Klover, "Order Opinions" - The Public's Perception of Injustice, 21 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1225, 1226 (1996).
8. Longan, supra note 2, at 296-97.
9. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 53.
10. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 56; see also Roger B. Parks, Police Response to
Victimization: Effects on Citizen Attitudes and Perceptions,in SAMPLE SURVFYS OF THE
VICTIMS OF CRIME 89, 101 (Wesley G. Skogan ed., 1976) (concluding that police
response to victims of domestic violence affects the victims' perceptions of the police and
speculating that victims may consequently increase their attention to police matters in the
future); Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributionaland ProceduralAspects of
Satisfaction with Citizen-PoliceEncounters, in BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281,

288-91 (1990) (finding that in individual encounters with the police, the "process
perceived as governing the attainment of a desired end-state is in fact attained," i.e., the
perception of fairness affected the overall evaluation of police performance independent
of whether the desired result was obtained). See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (studying cases
that proceeded to trial and concluding that satisfaction with the resolution of the dispute
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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minor offenses suggests the outcome of the case does not directly affect a
defendant's perception of the fairness of the proceeding." The study concluded
that defendants charged with minor offenses who fare "poorly at trial will not
denigrate the judge or the system so long as they believe their outcomes were
reached by fair procedures."' 2 Therefore, to be successful, a justice system must
appear to be fair and just to the public.
Public perception of the justice system and of lawyers has declined in
recent years. 3 Similarly, research reveals the government has also failed to

is not entirely determined by the outcome received).
11. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 69-70.
12. Tyler, supra note 4, at 70.
13. The modem attorney has often been referred to as the client's "hired gun." See
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 5-6 (1993)
(noting that many attorneys take the position of "my client: right or wrong"); Marvin L.
Karp, Some Reflections on Change-and Professionalism,THE BRIEF, Summer 1995, at
9, 10 (noting that, for some lawyers, "litigation has become synonymous with all-out
war," and attorneys act accordingly). Furthermore, the attorney is often told to either play
hardball or be replaced by an attorney who will. See Karp, supra, at 11. One observer
noted that "the public, and perhaps the profession itself, seem increasingly convinced that
lawyers are simply a plague on society." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future ofLegal
Ethics, 100 YALEL.J. 1239, 1240 (1991).
Commentators and scholars have lamented that the "legal profession is devolving
into the business of law," resulting in lawyers being less inclined to prohibit strategic
litigation and to refuse the pursuit of frivolous lawsuits. Ronald J. Gilson, The
Devolution of the Legal Profession:A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV.869,
869 (1990). As suggested by the American Bar Association: "[T]oday it may be asked:
Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, professionalism for commercialism?"
American Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Professionalism, In the Spirit ofPublic Service: A Blue
Printforthe RekindlingofLawyerProfessionalism,112 F.R.D. 243,251 (1986); see also
Marvin E. Aspen, The Judiciary-New Issues and New Visions: PromotingCivility in
Litigation,40 FED. B. NEWS &J., 496, 496-97 (1993) (defining the crisis in the law as "an
erosion of professionalism," noting the perception that the practice of law has changed
"from an occupation characterized by congenial professional relationships to one of
abrasive confrontations," and observing that the "general honorableness" of the
profession is compromised now that the practice of law has become a business); William
T. Braithwaite, Hearts and Minds: Can ProfessionalismBe Taught?, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1990, at 70, 72 (observing that the law has become "a profession moving away from its
traditional self-conception as a noble and learned profession toward, on the one hand, the
model of commerce, and on the other, the model of partisan politics").
Vic Gold, in his passionate 1985 article Take This Profession and Shove It,
described the transformation of the law after his graduation from law school to the time
of the Burger Court, which he claims will be remembered as the "ethical descent of the
legal profession to the level of a Baghdad flea market." Vic Gold, Take This Profession
and Shove It, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 1985, at 20. He noted that most young attorneys
graduating law school in the 1950s carried forth the idea that they were "officers of the
court," commissioned with the responsibility of aiding in the administration ofjustice."
For those who did not embrace or understand that concept, Gold observed: "That's why
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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maintain the public's trust. 14 This perception of the criminal justice system is
constantly under attack. This is because the system requires the police, the
prosecutors, and the court to impose restraints on citizens. 5 Additionally, the
system produces distress because the outcomes in criminal cases are seldom
favorable to all parties. 6 Therefore, it is critical that the process is fair and that
the participants' conduct is perceived to be just. 7
Assuming acceptance of the justice system is based primarily on the
public's view of fairness and justness of proceedings, those interested in
increasing acceptance of the system must consider the system's appearance.
Participants in the criminal justice system must be concerned themselves not

the Bar Association had an ethics committee." Id. While describing American law as
changing "from the status of a profession to that of a hustler's trade," Gold remarked:
A few years ago the ABA had a canon of ethics that said members of the bar
should avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" in their daily practice. But
that was too restrictive for the modem breed of relevant, responsive lawyers.
They lobbied until the canon was dropped from the code of professional
conduct. As a guardian of legel [sic] ethics the ABA today is a bladeless
knife.
Id. Finally, in discussing his license to practice law, Gold noted: "[O]nce it represented
membership in a profession with high ethical standards. Those who violated those
standards fell into disgrace. Now the American bar itself is a disgrace." Id. Gold went
on to say, "Consider me an ex-lawyer. And while you're at it, change that old joke.
Journalism isn't the second oldest profession. Not while there's a legal profession
around." Id. As Geoffrey C. Hazard opined, "there is no doubt that professionalism in
the bar is sorely in need of repair." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civility Code May Lead to
Less Civility, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 13, 13; see Interim Report of the Comm. on
Civility of the Seventh Fed. Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 375 (1991) (surveying
Seventh Circuit judges and lawyers and finding "there is widespread dissatisfaction...
at the gradual changing of the practice of law from an occupation characterized by
congenial professional relationships to one of abrasive confrontations"); see also Marvin
E. Aspen, A Specification of Civility Expectations and Comments: Excerpts from the
Seventh Circuit'sInterim Report ofthe Committee on Civility, 39 FED. B. NEWS &J. 304,
304-09 (1992) (highlighting portions of the Seventh Circuit's interim report); Jill
Nicholson, PromotingProfessionalism:ABA Committee is Catalyst For Goal Five
Proposals, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 146, 146 (discussing various programs
implemented by the ABA and other bar associations focused on improving lawyer
professionalism).
14. See Phillip Shaver, The Public Distrust, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Oct. 1980, at 44
(noting that, from 1966 through 1980, "the public's confidence in the leadership of almost
every major institution has declined"); Tyler, supra note 4, at 52.
15. See Tyler, supra note 4, at 52.
16. See Tyler & Folger, supra note 10, at 282.
17. See James D. Wright, PoliticalDisaffection, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 12-13 (Samuel L. Long ed., 1981) (concluding that democracy continues
because it is able to "help members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are
opposed").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3

4

19981

Flowers: Flowers: What You See Is What You Get:
APPEARANCE OFIMPROPRIETY STANDARD

only with the propriety and fairness of their actions, but also with the appearance
of their actions.' 8 This applies to an even greater extent to the prosecutor.
The prosecutor plays a unique role in the criminal justice system.' 9 This role
allows her to affect the public's judgment of fairness. 20 She 21 acts not only as
an advocate, but also as a minister ofjustice.22 Her role is both functional and
symbolic. 23 She represents the government and therefore acts as an advocate.
However, as a representative of the sovereign, she epitomizes the government
itself.24 Therefore, the public's perception of the prosecutor affects their
perception of the criminal justice system as a whole.
Because the prosecutor's actions affect not only the individual criminal case
but also the system as a whole, the prosecutor must be concerned with both the
propriety of her actions and the appearance of those actions. The current ethics
codes26 do not mandate that a prosecutor consider the appearance of her
actions.2 7 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not require such an
inquiry or consideration. However, the Rules do require a prosecutor to act as
a minister of justice; in that role, the prosecutor must consider the effect of the
appearance of her actions on the public perception of the system.28
In contrast to the Model Rules, the JudicialCode of Conduct requires a
judge to consider not only the propriety of his actions, but also the appearance
of his actions.29 The same policy considerations apply to the prosecutor. The
prosecutor's role has been described as a quasi-judicial role. This role places the
prosecutor in the position of both advocating and considering procedural
fairness.3" Just as the judge's actions can affect perception of the system, the
prosecutor's actions, as the representative of the government, influence the
public's acceptance of the system as fair.3'
This article addresses the application of the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard to the criminal prosecutor. Section Two discusses the history of the

18. See infra text accompanying notes 241-48.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 235-40.
21. For purposes of clarity, the prosecutor will be referred to as female. Other
lawyers and judges will be referred to as male.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 235-40.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
26. For purposes of this Article, I refer to ethics codes as those regulations codified
in the states by law or supreme court rule and enforceable in disciplinary proceedings.
This Article will distinguish ethical codes from standards which are not enforceable.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 131-36.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 241-48.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 172-96.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 216-22.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 235-40.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Appearance of Impropriety Standard. This section discusses the history of that
standard as a part of the Code of Professional Responsibility and its later
exclusion from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Section Three
discusses the JudicialCode ofEthics, which continues to contain an Appearance
of Impropriety Standard. This section also emphasizes the need for such a
standard based on the perceived role the judge plays in the justice system.
Section Four considers the quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor. This section
also discusses the need to include the Appearance of Impropriety Standard in
Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, as a further delineation of
the role of minister of justice. Section Five applies this standard to difficult
issues which arise in defining the appropriate behavior of prosecutors in
preparing witnesses for trial. This section concludes that applying this standard
to the prosecutor's pre-trial witness preparation gives the prosecutor guidance
which currently does not exist. Its application also requires the prosecutor to
consider the impact of her actions not only on individual cases, but also on the
system as a whole.

II. THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD
A. History ofEthics Codes
Prior to the 18th century, the legal profession was loosely defined, poorly
trained, and generally not well-received.32 In early colonial America, lawyers
were degraded openly and even prohibited from the courtroom. 33 Several

32. See David R. Papke, The Legal Professionand its EthicalResponsibilities:A
History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 30 (Michael Davis & Frederick A.
Elliston eds., 1986); see also ERWIN GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS INTHE UNITED
STATES 7 (1964) (noting that the early colonists had little use for the laws of England or
for lawyers). But see ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION INAMERICA 7 (1965) (noting conflict in historical accounts of the acceptance
of lawyers).
33. In Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay, for example, the courts prohibited paid
lawyers. Papke, supra note 32, at 30; see Lawrence Friedman, A History of American
Law, hi THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 22,22 (Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE LEGAL PROFESSION].
"A 1645 act of the Virginia House of Burgesses ordered all attorneys practicing for a fee
to be expelled from office. The penalty for violating this act was five thousand pounds
of tobacco." See Papke, supra note 32, at 30. Additionally, the CAROLINAS'
FUNDAMENTAL CONST. (1669) stated that it was "a base and vile thing to plead for money
or reward." Friedman, supra, at 22. The basis for mistrust of lawyers was varied. As
Lawrence Friedman reported in his essay, A History ofAmerican Law:
The Puritan leaders of Massachusetts Bay had an image of the ideal state.
Revolutionary or Utopian regimes tend to be hostile to lawyers, at least at
first. Lawyers of the old regime have to be controlled or removed; a new,
revolutionary commonwealth must start with new law and new habits. Some
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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colonial community leaders considered lawyers to be troublesome encouragers
of needless legal suits. 34 Furthermore, many colonists resented lawyers and
blamed the legal profession for the oppression from .which they had escaped in
England. 35 Additionally, many of the individuals who acted as lawyers were
incompetent and even unscrupulous. 36 Although some lawyers were trained in
England, there were no formal training requirements. 37 Law schools did not
exist in America before 1784. 3s The bar lacked mechanisms to enforce standards
because most bar associations were voluntary prior to the American
Revolution.39
The lawyer's skill became a necessary evil as towns grew in size and
culture, and as the law became increasingly complex.40 The practice of law
flourished immediately before the American Revolution. Many of the colonial

colonists, oppressed in England, carried with them a strong dislike for all
servants of government. Merchants and planters wished to run their affairs,
without intermediaries. The theocratic colonies believed in a certain kind of
social order, closely directed from the top. The legal profession, with its
special privileges and principles, its private, esoteric language, seemed an
obstacle to efficient or godly government. The Quakers of the Middle
Atlantic were opposed to the adversary system in principle. They wanted
harmony and peace. Their ideal was the "Common Peacemaker," and simple,
nontechnical justice. They looked on lawyers as sharp, contentious-and
unnecessary-people. For all these reasons, the lawyer was unloved in the
17th century.
Friedman, supra, at 22.
34. See Papke, supra note 32, at 30.
35. See CHROUST, supra note 32, at 27.
36. See CHROUST, supra note 32, at 27.
37. See CHROUST, supra note 32, at 27; GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 8; Papke,
supra note 32, at 31.
38. See CHROUST, supra note 32, at 29. During the colonial period, there were five
avenues by which a colonist could prepare to practice law: (1) read the scarce legal
information available; (2) work for the clerk of the court; (3) work as an apprentice in a
law firm; (4) travel to England to study; or (5) attend college. See Friedman, supra note
33, at 24-25.
39. See Papke, supra note 32, at 32.
40. See Papke, supra note 32, at 32. In the seventeenth century, "[r]oyal
nullification of anti-lawyer legislation... was partly responsible for Virginia's reluctant
acceptance" of its lawyers. See Papke, supra note 32, at 32. Additionally, colonial
leaders began taking steps to "ethically train" lawyers. See Papke, supra note 32, at 30
(emphasis added). In 1710, for instance, a prominent New England minister bade
lawyers to "'shun all those indirect ways of making haste to be rich, in which a man
cannot be innocent' ...

[and to] 'abhor... to appear in a dirty cause."' Papke, supra

note 32, at 31 (quoting Puritan minister Cotton Mather). By the late 1750s, every major
community contained "a competent, professional bar, dominated by brilliant and
successful lawyers ... despite all bias and opposition." Friedman, supra note 33, at 24.
41. See GRISWOLD, supranote 32, at 11; Papke, supra note 32, at 32.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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lawyers were considered to be at the top of the colonial gentry.42 As a class,
however, American lawyers lacked legal training and organization. 3
In the years between the American Revolution and the American Civil War
there was a general deterioration of the legal profession." Although the
legislature and the courts mandated legal training and bar requirements, the
period was one of "deprofessionalism. ' 45 Legislation allowed non-lawyers to
appear in court on behalf of others.46 Practice and training requirements often
were minimalized rather than increased
due to the growing demand for service
47
and a belief in social mobility.
In Dean Griswold's opinion, 1870 was the low point for the legal
profession. 8 Prior to that time, bar associations were loosely formed and lacked
the ability to enforce ethical standards. 49 However, after fading away during the
middle of the century, bar associations reappeared and increased in
organizational stability after 1870.50 The American Bar Association (ABA) was
founded in 1878 and various state and local bars began to subsequently associate
with it. 5' The organization of lawyers created a demand for "improved
professional ethics and greater surveillance of lawyers' conduct."5 2

42. See CHROUST, supra note 32, at 52. With the increase in the number and status
of lawyers, their influence began to increase as well. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at

9.
43. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 9, 20.
44. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 12-15. Although Dean Roscoe Pound called

the first half of the nineteenth century "the Golden Age of American Law," the
Revolutionary War created a mistrust of anything English, including English law. See
GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 12.
45. See GRISWOLD, supranote 32, at 15.
46. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 15. Griswold identifies several reasons for
the deprofessionalism. He notes that the influence of Jacksonian Democracy, the belief
in self-sufficiency, and the advancement of natural law all contributed to a sense that the
gentry lawyer was un-American. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 16; see also CHROUST,
supra note 32, at 286.
47. See Papke, supra note 32, at 34. Several states, by statute, eliminated
educational qualifications. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 16.
48. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 20.
49. See GRISWOLD, supra note 32, at 20; see also James W. Hurst, Professional
Associations andProfessionalEthics, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 33, at 98,

98 (noting that most of the bar associations during this period disappeared or became
merely social).

50. See Papke, supra note 32, at 36.
51. See Papke, supra note 32, at 36.
52. Papke, supra note 32, at 37. See also Hurst, supra note 49, at 98.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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The first "ethical" code originated in Alabama in 1887. 53 It was heavily
influenced by Judge George Sharswood's ethical ideals.5 4 Twenty state bar
associations then adopted formal rules of conduct during the final decade of the
century. Concurrently, the president of the ABA appointed a committee to
consider a nationwide code of ethics. 56 At the annual ABA meeting in 1905,
ABA President, Henry St. George Tucker, echoed President Theodore
Roosevelt's criticism of the legal profession's lack of standards. He repeated the
president's concerns that "'many of the most influential and most highly
remunerated members of the Bar' ... were bringing the law and the profession
into disrepute by advising their clients how 'to evade the laws which are made
Tucker warned that the president's
to regulate in the public interest ....
criticism forced the bar to question whether the ethics of the legal profession
rose to the "'high standard which its position of influence in the country
demands."' '58 By 1907, the association accepted the proposed draft of the
Canons of ProfessionalEthics.5 9 This draft originally consisted of thirty-two
"',

53. See ORLE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES & LAWYERS

11 (1952). Alabama's formal code was entitled "Rules for Governing the Conduct of
Attorneys." See Richard A. Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, LegalEthics, in THE PRACTICE
OF LAW 5 (1995).

54. Judge George Sharswood, while a trial court judge in Pennsylvania, wrote an
Essay on ProfessionalEthics. See PHILLIPS &McCoy, supra note 53, at 4; Papke, supra
note 32, at 37. In 1854, Judge Sharswood published his lectures, given at the University
of Pennsylvania, in A Compend ofLectures on the Aims and Duties of the Professionof
Law, in which he concluded that professional morality was entirely compatible with
arguing any and every case. See PHILLIPS & McCoy, supra note 53, at 4; Papke, supra
note 32, at 37-38. Additionally, Sharswood wrote that "[t]he dignity and importance of
the Profession of the Law, in a public point of view, can hardly be over-estimated. It is
in relation to society at large that it is proposed to consider it." GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS 9 (5th ed. 1884). Few doubt that Sharswood's
work "set forth the standards of conduct of the profession in the nineteenth century" and
influenced the creation of the formal codes of the twentieth century. PHILLIPS & MCCOY,
supra note 53, at 4. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & DEBORAH RHODE, THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 33, at 108; Papke, supra note 32, at 37-39.
55. See Papke, supra note 32, at 37.
56. See Papke, supra note 32, at 37. The Committee on Legal Education of the
American Bar Association wrote:
Your Committee has under consideration the desirability of instruction in the
legal and moral duties of lawyers; in other words, whether a need exists for
some special training in the ethics of the law, training which is systematic and
to be had in course, instead of being accidental and incidental.
PHILLIPS & MCCOY, supra note 53, at I1 (quoting 20 A.B.A. REP. 377 (1897)).
57. PHILLIPS & MCCOY, supra note 53, at 11; see also Zitrin & Langford, supra
note 53, at 5.
58. PHILLIPS &MCCOY, supra note 53, at II (quoting 1905 A.B.A. President Henry
St. George Tucker).
59. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 5. Simeon E. Baldwin stated:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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canons.60 Some of these were of "strictly moral tones,"' while others provided
"specific regulatory principles., 62 By 1920, all but thirteen states had adopted
the Canons. 63 In 1923, a special committee reexamined the Canons. As a result,
several Canons were added and others revised at the annual meeting in 1928. 6
Gradually, the number of ABA Canons increased to forty-seven.

If this code is accepted by the Bar Associations of every State, as a fair
general statement of the main duties of members of the legal profession, a
great purpose will be well accomplished. An authoritative criterion will be
supplied, by which every lawyer can be safely guided, when he is in doubt as
to the conduct he should pursue in respect to any of the questions which
oftenest [sic] prove a source of perplexity. The law student will have a
mentor, always at hand. The courts will hesitate less in enforcing the
discipline of the bar, since professional misconduct will be, more than ever
before, a sinning against the light.
Simeon E. Baldwin, The New American Code of Legal Ethics, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 541,
546-47 (1908).
60. Professor Papke comments that the adoption of the Canons would have brought
about "protests during the colonial or antebellum period given the visions of communal
unity or open-ended individual enterprise." Papke, supranote 32, at 37. However, in the
context of the early twentieth century, the boldness of the legal profession in managing
its own affairs was only natural. Papke, supra note 32, at 37.
61. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 5. For example, Canon 15 declared:
Nothing operates more certainly to create or foster popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure ofpublic
esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than
does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of
questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 611 (1997). Canon 32, entitled "The Lawyer's Duty in its Last
Analysis," stated:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or
political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer
render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers
we are, or disrespect of the judicial office which we are bound to uphold, or
corruption of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust,
or deception or betrayal of the public.
Id. at 615-16.
62. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 5. For example, Canon 13 provided that
"[a] contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all circumstances of the case." MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 61, at 610. Canon 9
prohibited a lawyer from communicating "upon the subject of the controversy with a
party represented by counsel." MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 61, at 609.
63. See HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 54, at 117.
64. See PHILLIPS & MCCOY, supra note 53, at 12.
65. See HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 54, at 117.
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In 1964, a committee was formed to develop a new set of standards.' The
result was the passage of the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in

1969.67 Noticeably, the forty-seven Canons had been reduced to nine.6 8 The
Code was structured into three sections: (1) the Canons, (2) the Disciplinary
Rules, and (3) the Ethical Considerations.69 Each Canon contained a general
principle. The disciplinary rules and ethical considerations interpreted and
enforced the broad principle.70
Most states voluntarily adopted at least part of the Code within a few
72
years. 7' By 1980, even the federal courts used the Code to regulate lawyers
73
and as evidence for juries in attorney malpractice cases.
Although the Code was rapidly accepted by state and federal courts, the
ABA began a revision just seven years after its adoption.74 The revision was
motivated, in part, by a desire to eliminate the Code's vague standards and

66. Former ABA president and future Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell
formed the committee to develop the new set of standards. See Zitrin & Langford, supra
note 53, at 5.
67. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 5.
68. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
69. The preliminary statement explained:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general
terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their
relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal
profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical

Considerations and Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory
in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.
Preliminary Statement 2 (1969).
70. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 6.
71. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 5. Some states made word and

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

sentence changes in the Model Code; however, the changes where minimal and usually
did not effect the content of the rule. The one exception was California, which rejected
or substantially changed many of the disciplinary rules and deleted all of the ethical
considerations. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS xxii (1997); HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 54, at 118.
72. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,449 U.S.

888 (1980).
73. See id. at 935; Mark H. Aultman, A Moral Vision Refuses to Die, 8 J. LEGAL
PROF. 31,32 (1983); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., TheFuture ofLegalEthics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1251 (1991). See generally J. Randolph Evans & Anthony Morris, Legal Ethics,
47 MERCER L. REv. 197 (1995).
74. See Hazard, supra note 73, at 1251.
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replace them with legally binding rules.75 The Code was considered
unenforceable.76 Therefore, it was useless in combating dissatisfaction with the
legal profession." Others noted
that the revision was due to "'tremendous
78
changes ... in the profession.'
The social climate mandating improvements in ethical standards arose in
the wake of the Watergate scandal. As a result of Watergate, the public became
aware of questionable professional practices. 79 The public began to question
whether the legal profession could regulate itself. Opinion polls revealed
attomeys rated poorly with the public.80 Leading legal scholars questioned the
profession's ethical underpinnings. 8' Because of problems with the Code and
public perception of the profession, the ABA formed another commission to
reconsider the established standards.

75. See Hazard, supra note 73, at 1251. Professor Hazard argues that the radical
change toward binding legal ethics rules occurred with the adoption of the Code of
ProfessionalConduct,which contained black letter disciplinary rules. See Hazard, supra
note 73, at 1251.
76. See HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 54, at 118; Aultman, supra note 73, at 32
(asserting that the Code was unconstitutionally vague).
77. Professors Hazard and Rhode observed that "the disparity between what [the
Code's] Ethical Considerations exhorted and what its Disciplinary Rules required was
fostering cynicism about the bar's aspirational norms." HAZARD & RHODE, supra note
54, at 118.
78. Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., The Kutak Commission Report: Retrospect and
Prospect, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 475,488 (1982) (quoting ABA President S. Shepard Tate).
79. See MICHAEL DAVIS &FREDERICK ELLISON, ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
11 (Micheal Davis & Frederick A. Ellison eds., 1986); see also Sarah J. Cox,
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 383 (1976)
("Watergate served to sharpen [the people's] focus on and justified [their] concerns about
the system."); Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety:Ethics Reform and the
Blifil Paradoxes,44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 598-601 (1992) (observing that, shortly after
Watergate, there occurred an explosion of articles and judicial decisions on judicial ethics
and the application of the Appearance of Impropriety Standard). In response, the ABA
mandated in 1974 that all law schools "provide and require for all student candidates for
a professional degree
profession."

. . .

instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal

ABA APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS: ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF

PROCEDURE § 302(a)(iii) (1979). See also DAVIS & ELLISON, supra, at 11 (explaining
that the most popular way of meeting this mandate was through a course entitled
"Professional Responsibility" or "Legal Ethics").
80. See DAVIS & ELLISON, supra note 79, at 11. A poll taken in 1977 revealed that
only 26% of the people polled rated attorneys' ethical standards as high. See DAVIS &
ELLISON, supra note 79, at 11. On the other end of the spectrum, 26% rated attorneys'
ethics as low. See DAVIS & ELLISON, supra note 79, at 11.
81. See DAVIS & ELLISON, supra note 79, at 11, (pointing to criticisms by Monroe
Freedman and Chief Justice Warren Burger).
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The new committee was directed to create standards consisting of more
"black letter" law.8 2 This commission was headed by Robert Kutak and was
known as the "Kutak Commission." Most of the Commission's work occurred
under "public scrutiny." 83 The Commission published drafts of its rules which
were debated by both lawyers and the general public.84 There are at least four
drafts in existence; however, the Kutak Commission published only three drafts
of its proposed rules." After much debate, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the final draft of the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct on August
2, 1983.86 The Rules are divided into brief rules followed by longer comment
sections. The rules are authoritative, while the comments are intended as
interpretational guides.
Many states, having recently adopted the Code, were hesitant to adopt
another set of Rules which had an entirely different organizational scheme.8
However, tables cross-referencing the Code Canons helped to market the new
Rules.89 By 1994, forty-four states and the District of Columbia had adopted the
Model Rules in some form. 90 The Model Rules have survived as the ABA

82. Elisabeth E. Boyan, Reconsidering(Again) Conflict ofInterest Arising From
Lawyers Representing Lawyers in New Jersey, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1377, 1383
(1996) (quoting the Kutak Commission's goal to "produce rules of professional conduct
that preserve fundamental values while providing realistic, useful guidance for lawyer
conduct").
83. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 7; see also Hazard, supra note 73, at 1253.
84. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 6. Professor Hazard opined that the
method of drafting and adoption of the Model Rules reflected the increased "legalization"
of lawyers' regulation. Hazard, supra note 73, at 1251.
85. The drafts included (1) The Working Draft, summer 1979, (2) the Discussion
Draft, June 30, 1980, (3) the Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981, and (4) the Proposed
Final Draft, June 30, 1982. See Aultman, supra note 73, at 34-35. The drafts differ
significantly. The original draft was very discipline laden, but, gradually, many of the
obligatory regulations were weeded out in favor of discretionary ones, usually
accomplished by the insertion of the word "may." See Aultman, supra note 73, at 35.
In addition, there was an Alternative Draft, dated May 30, 1981, which purported to
retain the format of the disciplinary rules and ethical considerations; however, this draft
has been called more of a "political than substantive maneuver." Aultman, supra note
73, at 34.
86. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra n6te 71, at xxii; HAZARD & RHODE, supra note
54, at 118; Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., DisqualificationofAttorneys andJudges, C380
ALI-ABA 651, 704 (1989).
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 7-9 (1997).
88. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 7.
89. See Zitrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 7.
90. Five states, including Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia,
incorporated the Model Rules in their governing standards. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra
note 71, at xxii. California has never adopted either the Rules or the Code. See GILLERS
& SIMON, supra note 71, at xxii; Zirtrin & Langford, supra note 53, at 7.
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standards governing attorney conduct for fourteen years. However, the
profession's ethics continue to come under fire from attorneys and the public.9

B. Canon 9 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
Canon 9, including its prohibition against the appearance of impropriety,
emerged as a new addition to the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,
adopted in 1969.92 Canon 9's substance had never been overtly expressed."
However, its prohibition was implied throughout the old preamble,94 and in
Canons 29 95 and 32.96 Several pre-1969 ABA opinions warned against the
appearance of impropriety. 97 Additionally, prior to the Model Code, courts had

91. See supra note 13 for a discussion of the negative perception of lawyers.
92. Canon 9 stated: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1969).
93. See RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 125 (2d ed. 1970). Ethical
Consideration 9-6 contained the principles of old Canons 1, 3, 6, 11, 15, 16, 22, 29, 32,
36, 37, and 41. Id. at 125 n.9.
94. The preamble to the Canons of Professional Ethics provided:
In America, where the stability of courts and of all departments of government
rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system
for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of
efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic,
to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied.
It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members
of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Preamble (1908). See WISE, supra note 93, at 125.
95. Canon 29, entitled "Upholding the Honor of the Profession," provided in part:
"[An attorney] should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity
of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of Justice."
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908). See WISE, supra note 93, at 125.
96. Canon 32 provided: "Above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and
as a patriotic and loyal citizen." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1908). See
WISE, supra note 93, at 125.
97. WISE, supra note 93, at 125. For instance, in Opinion 134, the ABA warned
that a former state attorney could not defend a person he had previously prosecuted
because the public would "naturally infer" that the attorney would take advantage of his
prior connections with the prosecutor's office. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 134 (1935), reprintedin OPINIONS OF THE COMM. ON PROF'L
ETHICS 399, 400 (1967) [hereinafter OPINIONS]. Another formal opinion explained: "If
the profession is to occupy that position in public esteem which will enable it to be of the
greatest usefulness, it must avoid not only all evil but must likewise avoid the appearance
of evil." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 49 (1931),
reprinted in OPINIONS, supra,at 290, 292 (emphasis added). See Victor H. Kramer, The
Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the FederalJudicial Process
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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disqualified attorneys based upon the "appearance of evil" standard, even though
the record may have been free of any evidence of wrongdoing. 98 These courts
based their rulings on a concern for keeping the public and private segments of
the profession above suspicion.99
With the adoption of Canon 9, the "appearance" principal was applicable
to all aspects of an attorney's professional life. It related to "the entire spectrum
of an attorney's conduct."' "c° One court noted that an attorney should act in a
manner which would gain "at least the confidence normally reposed in the parish
was designed to protect and encourage public
priest."' 0 ' Clearly, the Canon 02
confidence in the legal system.
As the term "appearance" suggests, professional conduct under Canon 9
was evaluated from "the eye of the beholder."'0 3 Canon 9 expressed the concern
that "ethical conduct may appear unethical to a layman. This perception may
erode public confidence in the legal system."' 4 To illustrate, Robert H. Aronson

Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243, 245 (1980).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964)
(finding "no exceptions to the exhortation to abstain from all appearance of evil"); W.E.
Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Conn. 1961), affd, 302 F.2d
268 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Appealability of Orders
Denying Motionsfor Disqualificationof Counsel in FederalCourts, 45 U. Cnl. L. REV.
450 (1978).
99. State v. Bums, 322 S.W.2d 736, 742 (Mo. 1959) (stating that "prosecuting
officials, like Caesar's wife, ought to be above suspicion"). See generally, Annotation,
What CircumstancesJustify DisqualificationofProsecutorin FederalCriminal Cases,
110 A.L.R. Fed. 523 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
100. Weber v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977), overruled in part
on other grounds by hI Re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.

1980).
101. Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979),
overruled in part on other grounds byln re Multi-Piece Rim Prod. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1980). A commentator later noted that meeting the "parish priest" standard
would not be difficult given the unsavory publicized activities of prominent religious
leaders within the Eighth Circuit. Donald R. McMinn, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356:
New Justification for Increased Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney
Disqualification,65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1275 n.324 (1990).
102. Dean Foods, 605 F.2d at 386 n.5 (noting that one or two appearances of
ethical blindness can tar the entire profession).
103. Weber, 566 F.2d at 609. The test was whether a "member of the public, or of
the bar, [sees] an impropriety" in the attorney's conduct. Id.
104. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Code states as follows:
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion ethical conduct of a lawyer may
appear to laymen to be unethical .... When explicit ethical guidance does not
exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system
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stated that "because the appearance of impropriety can be just as damaging as
actual impropriety to public respect for the law and clients' belief in their
attorneys' loyalty, attorneys must ensure that their conduct does not reasonably
appear to have been influenced by conflicting interests."'"5 Aronson further
warned the boundary between ethical and unethical behavior is not clearly
defined; consequently, ' "a6 good rule-of-thumb" for attorneys to follow was,
"when in doubt, don't."'
Following the adoption of the Code, a sharp division developed among the
courts concerning the proper handling of cases involving the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard. Some courts used Canon 9 as the basis for disqualifying
attorneys. 10 7 They explained that disqualification was an ethical, rather than
legal, matter'0 8 and that it was in the public's and client's interest. 1 9 For
example, the Eighth Circuit, in Arkansas v. Dean FoodsProducts Co., reversed

a district court's refusal to disqualify an attorney based on Canon 9.110 In Dean
Foods, the court found that Canon 9 was "inextricably wedded" to Canon 4,
which admonished the lawyer to preserve his client's confidences and secrets.'"
The attorney-client relationship requires that a client believe his lawyer will keep
his confidences. In a conflict situation, the client may fear that his secrets will
not be kept. In order to preserve the relationship, courts have disqualified

and legal profession.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1981); see also Ohio v. Cooper,
409 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ohio 1980) (noting that disqualification is necessary to "ensure
the faith of the people in the efficacy of the judicial system").
105. Robert H. Aronson, Conflict ofInterest, 52 WAsH. L. REv. 807, 810 (1977).

106. Id. at 811.
107. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir.
1974) (discussing the need for disqualification even though the record was free of
wrongdoing as necessary to keep the profession above suspicion); see also Kramer, supra
note 97, at 250-64 (discussing at length the cases which applied Canon 9 alone as the
basis for disqualification).
108. See Arkansas v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1979),
overruledin part on othergrounds by In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 612 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1980); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1127 (5th Cir.

1971).
109. See Dean Foods, 605 F.2d at 384.

110. Id. See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th
Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 385. See also Pantry Pride, Inc. (In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litig.)
v. Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg & Casey, 697 F.2d 524, 530-31 (3d Cir.
1982); Hannon v. State, 266 So. 2d 825, 830 (Ala. Crim. App. 1972) (discussing the
defendant's concern that confidential information he gave to the prosecuting attorney
when that attorney previously represented the defendant might be divulged to other
prosecutors).
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attorneys based on the appearance standard. For this reason, 2Canon 9 could be
a basis for disqualification when Canon 4 was unavailable."
In it re CoordinatedPretrialProceedingsin PetroleumProductsAntitrust

Litigation," 3 the Ninth Circuit justified reliance on Canon 9 as the sole basis for
disqualification of an attorney. The court noted that "[i]f Canon 9 were not
separately enforceable, it would be stripped of its meaning and significance.
This suggests that it must be a sufficient ground for disqualification in itself."' 4
Additionally, the Second Circuit found that Canon 9 dictated that all doubts be
resolved in favor of disqualification.'
The Third Circuit, in Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp.,"6 noted that "the appearance of conduct associated7
with institutions of the law [is] as important as the conduct itself.''

Furthermore, another court opined that preserving public trust sufficiently
justified the standard even where a party could
8 not show a reasonable possibility
that an identifiable impropriety occurred."
However, most courts which addressed Canon 9 emphasized that there must
be "at least a reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable
impropriety did in fact occur," even though no wrongdoing was required for
action under the Canon.'
Consequently, a two-prong test evolved for
determining the disqualification of an attorney under Canon 9.2 The first prong
required that a reasonable possibility of wrongdoing existed. The second prong

112. See Dean Foods, 605 F.2d at 385.

113. 658 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982).
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
757 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Banton v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1160, 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)

("The public trust in the integrity of the judicial process requires us to resolve any serious
doubt in favor of disqualification.") (quoting State v. Tippecanoe County Court., 432
N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (Ind. 1982)).
116. 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976).

117. Id. at 1088.
118. Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 516, 520 n.3
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (rejecting the two part test as undermining the concerns of Canon 9
regarding the public's perception). See General Motors Corp. v. United States 573 F.2d
936, 942 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding an appearance of impropriety where an IRS attorney
was appointed to conduct a grand jury investigation when the IRS attorney had been
involved in a previous tax return investigation of the defendant); State v. Latigue, 502

P.2d 1340, 1342 (Ariz. 1972) (disqualifying a prosecuting attorney's office because the
chief deputy county attorney had previously represented the defendant, even though no
actual misconduct was found).
119. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976). See
State v. Rizzo, 350 A.2d 225, 226 (N.J. 1975).
120. See United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 906 (1982); Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 n.12; Petroleum Wholesale v. Marshall, 751
S.W.2d 295, 3.00 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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balanced public suspicion against the social interests
which would be served by
21
the attorney's continued participation in the case.'
Several courts strongly criticized Canon 9. The Fifth Circuit, in Woods v.
Covington County Bank, warned that an "overly broad application of Canon
Nine... would ultimately be self-defeating."' 2' The Second Circuit, in Board
2
of Education v. Nyguist,1'
refused to disqualify an attorney finding that
"appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a
disqualification order."' 24 Judge Mansfield's concurrence in Nyguist warned that
an appearance of impropriety was insufficient grounds to justify a court's
disqualification of an attorney. 25 Judge Mansfield opined that a disqualification
order must be supported by a reasonable basis to believe such appearance may
affect the outcome. 26 Furthermore, in an en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit
warned that the disqualification of attorneys is a "drastic measure
which courts
' 27
should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary.'
Scholars have also rejected the use of the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard. A 1978 ChicagoLaw Review article argued that although many courts
speak of avoiding the appearance of impropriety, disqualification should not be
employed absent actual misconduct. 2 Additionally, Victor Kramer criticized
Canon 9 cases as turning upon judges' perceptions of public feeling on a specific
ethical issue. 29 Further, he noted, "[w]hat lay persons sometimes perceive as
impropriety is frequently in the highest tradition of the bar: for example,
representing unpopular clients, defending the guilty, and being courteous to
opposing counsel during the course of a trial.' ' 0

121. See Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828; Kraft, Inc. (In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.) v.
Alton Box Bldg. Co., 659 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. 537 F.2d at 813. Woods held that an attorney's conduct should not be
governed by the standards which could be imputed to the "most cynical members of the
public." Id. The court stated that motions for disqualification are sometimes merely
tactical moves, and as such, the delay or disadvantage caused by unnecessary
disqualifications under the Appearance of Impropriety Doctrine could cause even more
public suspicion of the bar and the judiciary than the original hint of possible impropriety.
See id.

123. 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979).
124. Nyguist, 590 F.2d at 1247 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
125. See id. (noting the importance of a client's right to chose his own lawyer).
126. See id.

127. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir.
1982) (stating that the disqualification of counsel deprives the client of his chosen
representation and should therefore be viewed with extreme caution).
128. See McConnell, supra note 98, at 459-60.
129. See Kramer, supra note 97, at 264.
130. Kramer, supra note 97, at 265.
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The new Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, adopted in 1983, omitted
the Appearance of Impropriety Standard, noting a two-fold problem.' First, the
Commission explained that the standard could apply to any attorney-client
relationship which made a former client uncomfortable. 32 This resulted in a
Second, the Commission found
question of the client's subjective judgment.'
that the standard was "question-begging" because the term "impropriety" was
undefined. 34 One commentator noted the application of the appearance standard
gave "rise to some of the most broad and uncertain rules under the code."' 35 The
ABA feared that inclusion of this standard would cause disciplinary proceedings
into a
to degenerate "from the determination of fact issues specified by the rule
136
determination on an instinctive, ad hoc, or even ad hominem basis."'
Prior to the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and
despite the controversy surrounding Canon 9, the courts continued to examine
cases involving the appearance of impropriety. The Third Circuit, in responding
to the final proposed draft of the Model Rules, which omitted Canon 9 as
overbroad and question-begging, noted the ethical duties arising under Canon
9 proceeded on "a case-by-case basis, involving careful sifting and weighing of
relevant circumstances and facts.', 137 Asserting that the Appearance of

13 1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983).
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983); Boyan,
supra note 82, at 1395 n.42; Kramer, supra note 97, at 265 n.131.
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983); Kramer,
supra note 97, at 265.
134. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983). See
Gabianelli v. Azar, 777 P.2d 1167, 1168 (Alaska 1989); Lee E. Hejmanowski, An Ethical

Treatment of Attorneys' Personal Conflicts of Interest, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 881, 897
(1993) (noting that "courts and legal conduct rules renounced the standard on the grounds
that, standing alone it was inherently vague"); Kramer, supra note 97, at 265.
135. CHARLES E. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 315 (1986).
136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 n.17

(1985). Although the Committee rejected the Appearance of Impropriety Standard due
to its vagueness, Rule 8.4 included an equally vague standard. See John F. Sutton, Jr.,

How Vulnerable is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 497, 502
n. 13 (1979) (criticizing the proscription against conduct prejudicial to the administration

of justice as providing insufficient notice to lawyers). Although Rule 8.4 prohibits
conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice," this concept is undefined.
See Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal
Profession, 48 TEX. L. REv. 267, 275-76 (1970). The application of this standard requires
the same case-by-case analysis as the Appearance of Impropriety Standard which was
respected by the writers of the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct. See WOLFRAM,

supranote 135, at 315; Martha Elizabeth Johnston, Comment, ABA Code ofProfessional
Responsibility: Voidfor Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 671, 684-85 (1979) (finding the
prohibition leaves open the possibility that lawyers will be disciplined because of
unorthodox or politically unpopular conduct or views).
137. Pantry Pride, Inc. (In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litig.) v. Finley, Kumble,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Impropriety Standard was necessarily vague, the court looked to other provisions
of the ABA Code for guidance to mark its precise contour.'38

C. The Appearance of Impropriety StandardAfter the Adoption of the
Model Rules
The trend following the adoption of the Model Rules was "away from
disqualification based solely on an appearance of impropriety."' 39 However, the
appearance of impropriety as a standard persisted in post-Model Rules cases.1 40
Courts continued to employ the Appearance of Impropriety Standard, even
though the rationale for the ethics regulation had been continually criticized in
scholarly studies and eliminated from bar-created codes of conduct.' 4' Courts
also continued to stress the importance of the "public's trust in the legal
profession and the judicial process."' 14 For example, in Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc., 143 the court held the appearance of impropriety to be a factor in
side-switching cases1 44 The court stated that "[w]hile 'appearance of

Wagner, Heine, Underberg & Casey, 697 F.2d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1982).
138. See id.
139. Sherrod v. Berry, 589 F. Supp. 433, 436 (N.D. 111. 1984). See Telectronics
Proprietary v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1338 (U.S. Ct. App. 1988).
140. See Hejmanowski, supra note 133, at 897. See generally Herwig v. Marine
Shale Processors, No. 92-2753, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 231 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1994);
Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988);
Boyan, supra note 82, at 1377-80 (discussing the continued use of the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard in New Jersey).
141. See WOLFRAM, supra note 135, at § 7.1.4; Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best
Regulate the Ethics of FederalProsecutors,or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?:
Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 429, 453-54 (1996).
142. Contant v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 826 F. Supp. 427, 428 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(stressing the role of the court in maintaining the integrity of the legal system). But see
Bowman v. Bank of Delaware, No. 87-44-CMW, 1988 W.L. 54669 (D. Del. May 24,
1988) (refusing to apply appearance standard); Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295 (N.D.
111. 1985).
143. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
144. See id. at 1269; see also In re Inquiry to the Adversary Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, 616 A.2d 1290, 1291 (N.J. 1992) (finding an appearance of impropriety where a
full-time police officer associated with a criminal defense firm). Side-switching refers
to those cases where an attorney has previously represented the party in opposition to her
current client. Such conduct implicates several ethical rules in addition to the Appearance
of Impropriety Standard. The MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997)
prohibits representation of a client when that representation will be directly adverse to the
representation of another current client. Rule 1.9 prohibits representations in certain
situation when the current representation is adverse to a client the attorney has formerly
represented. MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCTRule 1.9 (1997). Finally, Rule
1.1 1 addresses this conflict of interest specifically for government employees. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.
11 (1997).
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impropriety' as a principle of professional ethics invites and maybe has
undergone uncritical expansion because of its vague and open-ended character,
in this case it has meaning and weight."' 45 The court noted that "when a law
'unsavory appearance' is difficult to dispel in the 'eyes
firm switches sides 1the
46
of the lay public."",
Although recognizing the exact language of Canon 9 was not included in
the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, courts continued to require attorneys
to avoid the appearance of impropriety. 47 In FirstAmerican Carriers,Inc. v.
Kroger Co., the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that although "Canon 9 is not
expressly adopted by the Model Rules, the principle applies because its meaning
pervades the Rules and embodies their spirit.' 48 The court further stated that the
Appearance of Impropriety Standard was included in "what the preamble to the
Rules refers to as 'moral and ethical considerations' that should guide lawyers,
who have a 'special responsibility for the quality ofjustice. ' ' ' 149 In 1990, the
Arizona Court of Appeals recognized that, although reliance on the Appearance
of Impropriety Standard in evaluating attorney conduct has been weakened by
the new Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, "the appearance of impropriety
...still has a definite place in the balancing test the trial court must apply in
resolving the question of disqualification."'" 0 In 1996, a New Jersey court relied
upon the appearance of impropriety as the basis for disqualification in a
side-switching case.'' The court noted the "much maligned" Appearance of
exists to "engender, protect, and preserve the trust and
Impropriety Standard still
52
confidence of clients."'

145. Analytica, 708 F.2d at 1269.
146. Id. See also supra note 144 and accompanying text.
147. See In re Starr, 986 F. Supp. 1144, 1154 n.12 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (holding that
the Appearance of Impropriety Standard is "implicit in the Model Rules"); First Am.
Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ark. 1990).
148. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d at 672.
149. Id.
150. Turbin v. Superior Court 797 P.2d 734, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). See
Gomez v. Superior Court, 717 P.2d 902, 904 (Ariz. 1986).
151. Cardona v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 968, 975 (D.N.J. 1996);
ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual of Professional Conduct, Current Reports, Sept. 18, 1996.
152. Cardona,942 F. Supp. at 975.
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III. CANON 2: THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY WITHIN THE
JUDICIARY

A. Code History
The judicial equivalent to the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct is the
Model Code of JudicialConduct. An ethics code for judges first appeared in

1924 when the ABA set forth the CanonsofJudicialEthics, consisting of thirtyfour canons." Supreme Court Justice William Howard Taft headed the drafting
committee for the Canons, which were intended to be an aspirational behavioral
guide rather than a mandate.'55 The 1924 Canons reflected a traditional view of
the judge as one who dispensed justice in a blind, mechanical way.156
Accordingly, the Canons emphasized the need for impartial and consistent
results.'57 Over the next fifty years, a number of states adopted the Canons either

153. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
154. See Robert J. Martineau, Enforcement of the Code ofJudicialConduct, 1972
UTAH L. REV. 410, 410; Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or
Passion?,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 605 (1996).
155. See Shaman, supra note 154, at 605. The preamble to the Canons stated:
[T]he American Bar Association, mindful that the character and conduct of a
Judge should never be objects of indifference, and that declared ethical
standards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to set forth its views
respecting those principles which should govern the personal practice of
members of the Judiciary in the administration of their office. The
Association accordingly adopts the following Canons, the spirit of which it
suggests as a proper guide and reminder forjudges, and as indicating what the
people have a right to expect from them.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Preamble (1924). See also Brain Holland, The Code of
JudicialConduct and the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct: A Comparison ofEthical
CodesForJudges andLawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 725, 726 (1989) (indicating that
the implication from the phrase "a proper guide and reminder to judges" was that the
Canons were not intended to be binding).
156. See Shaman, supra note 154, at 605.
157. For example, Canon 20 provided that a judge's duty is to apply general law
to specific factual issues, stating:
[O]urs is a government of law and not of men, and that he violates his duty as
a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may
personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the
general law as he knows it to be binding on him. He should administer his
office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of the law.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1924). The next Canon, entitled "Idiosyncrasies
and Inconsistencies," stated: "Justice should not be molded by the individual
idiosyncrasies of those who administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected
method of doing justice, and not seek to by extreme or peculiar in his judgments, or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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verbatim or in an amended version. The Canons were seen as mere guidelines
in some states. 58 However, they were enforced as binding regulations of
judicial conduct in others.' 59
In 1969, the president of the American Bar Association appointed
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor to chair the Special
Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct to reexamine the Canons. For
three years, the committee revised, reorganized, rewrote, and even renamed the
Canons to establish "higher and more explicit standards ofjudicial conduct.""'
At the 1972 annual meeting, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct. 6' This version began: "[I]n the judgment of the
[American Bar] Association this Code, consisting of statements of norms,
denominated Canons, the accompanying text setting forth specific rules, and the
commentary, states the standards that judges should observe. The Canons and
62
text establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated."'
Seventeen years later, in 1989, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility published a final draft of a revised Model Code
ofJudicial Conduct. This was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1990.
This version was similar to the 1972 model; however, it attempted to answer
63
several questions concerning whether the Code was optional or obligatory.'
This was done, in part, by substituting the word "shall" for the word "should. ' ' "M

spectacular or sensational in the conduct of the court." CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Canon 21 (1924).
158. See Martineau, supra note 154, at 410-11 (commenting that based on the
suggestive rather than regulatory nature of the Canons, the ABA intended mere guidelines
for judicial conduct); Shaman, supra note 154, at 605 (noting that the Code was rarely
enforced).
159. In re Kohn, 568 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Mo. 1978) (concluding "that evidence of
judicial conduct in violation of the Canons or Code may be considered in determining
whether particular acts complained of rise to the level of misconduct"); Mahoning County
Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 151 N.E.2d 17, 21 (Ohio 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959)
(holding that "the Canons of Judicial Ethics... provide the basis for the disciplining of
members of the legal profession who hold judicial positions"); Jenkins v. Oregon State
Bar, 405 P.2d 525, 527-28 (Or. 1965) ("The rules promulgated by this court concerning
professional and judicial ethics are not merely pious exhortations."). See generally
Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Powerof Courtto Remove or SuspendJudge, 53 A.L.R.
3d 882 (1996).
160. Abramson, supra note 5, at 949 n.1. See Shaman, supra note 154, at 607.
161. See Shaman, supra note 154, at 607.
162. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990).
163. For instance, the term "should" was replaced with "shall." Abramson, supra
note 5,at 949 n. 1. Additionally, the 1990 Code is written in gender-neutral language.
See Abramson, supra note 5, at 949 n.1.
164. The preamble clarifies as follows:
When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding
obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action. When
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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The Code also added a preamble and a terminology section. 6 1 The preamble
emphasized that the Code was not a complete set of rules."6 However, it made
clear the Code was not just aspirational, but was binding on judges. 67
Today, almost every state has adopted a code ofjudicial conduct. 68 Most
of those Codes are modeled after either the 1972 Model Code or the more recent
1990 Code. 69 The United States Judicial Conference has adopted a new Code
7 I
70
ofJudicialConduct, which also includes provisions from the Model Code.'

B. The Appearance of Impropriety Standard
The Appearance of Impropriety Standard persisted in the Judicial Code
despite being excluded from the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct. Canon
2 of the 1990 Model Code of JudicialConduct states: "A Judge Shall Avoid
Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's
Activities."' 72 The Commentary to Canon 2(A) offers guidance to judges as to
the meaning of Canon 2(A)'s terms. 73 Specifically, the Commentary makes
clear the standard applies to both the judge's personal and professional

"should" or "should not" is used, the text is intended as hortatory and as a
statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule
under which a judge may be disciplined.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble 2 (1990).
165. See Abramson, supra note 5, at 949 n. 1.
166. "The Code of Judicial Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the
conduct ofjudges. They should also be governed in their judicial and personal conduct
by general ethical standards." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble 6 (1990).
167. See Holland, supra note 155, at 726. The preamble provides: "The Code is
intended, however, to state basic standards which should govern the conduct of all judges
and to provide guidance to assist judges in establishing high standards of judicial and
personal conduct." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble 6 (1990).
168. See GILLERS & SIMON, supranote 71, at 550; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1073
(noting that 47 of 50 states adopted codes based on the ABA model, while the other three
states adopted their own sets of rules).
169. As of May 1996, 20 states had adopted the 1990 Model Code, including
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. See GILLERS & SIMON,
supra note 71, at 550. Additionally, 17 other jurisdictions have adopted portions of the
Model Code, including Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 71, at 550.

170. The Code adopted by the United States Judicial Conference is advisory only.
See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1073.
171. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1073.
172. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
173. See Abramson, supra note 5, at 953.
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behavior. 74 Additionally, it defends the necessity of using general terms. 75
'
Finally, the Commentary states the test for applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard "is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds
a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."' 76
The focus of Canon 2(A) is on the need for public trust in the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary.'77 In order for a judge to possess the
confidence of the community, "justice must not only be done, it must be seen to
be done."' 178 For this reason, judges are subject to discipline under Canon 2(A)
for both personal and professional behavior.'79 The sanctioned behavior does not
need to be either criminal or tortious to be a violation of Canon 2(A). 80 The

174. "The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of the judge." MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. [2] (1990).

175. The commentary states:
Because it is not practicable to list all prohibited acts, the proscription is
necessarily cast in general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is
harmful although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual
improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other
specific provisions of this Code.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. [2] (1990). See Napolitano v.

Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.) ("[Conduct which does not constitute a criminal
offense may be sufficiently violative of the Judicial Canons to warrant removal for
cause."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972); Abramson, supra note 5, at 953 (observing
that the general language of Canon 2 has withstood constitutional attack); see also
Shaman, supra note 154, at 582 (concluding that the general nature of the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard allows it to be applied to a variety of situations).
176. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. [2] (1990). The ABA

rejected several alternative ideas, including (1) acts which violated a "clear and accepted
community standard," and (2) a list of examples that were not "per se violations but
nonetheless would taint the judiciary." Abramson, supra note 5, at 953 n. 15 (citing
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 7-8 (Discussion Draft 1989)).

177. See Holland, supra note 155, at 732; Irving R. Kaufinan, Lions and Jackals:
The Function of a Code ofJudicialEthics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 4 (1970).

178. In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 753 (Mich. 1977) (citations omitted). See
also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) ("[T]o perform its high function in the
best way, justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice."); Brian T. Fitzgerald, Sealed v.
Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Private,6 J.L. & POL. 381, 398 (1990)
(concluding that "one of the most important policies underlying open courts [is] the
maintenance of public confidence in the judicial process").
179. See Kaufman, supra note 177, at 5.
180. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (finding that
expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance or anger do not establish bias or
prejudice"); Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.) (explaining that "separation
of the behavior of a judge while off the bench from his conduct in the courtroom is
impossible"), cert.denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972); In re Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291, 1304
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Canon looks to prohibit that8 judicial conduct which "malign[s] the public's

confidence in the judiciary."' '
The persistence of the Appearance of Impropriety Standard in the Judicial
Code can, in part, be explained by ideological differences between the Judicial
Code and the lawyers' ethics code. As Judge Kaufian stated: "To a significant
degree, our concept of a code of judicial ethics is shaped by our notion of the
role it regulates."' 82 In order to function, the judiciary must receive the respect
and support which comes from being seen as independent.183 A judge's
independence can be tainted not only by his activities on the bench, but also by
his conduct outside the courtroom. Therefore, the judge's role includes both
professional and nonprofessional behavior." On the other hand, the lawyer's
role is generally restricted to interaction with the judicial system.'85 His conduct
outside his relationship with clients has very little effect on his ability to
represent clients.
In keeping with these fundamental differences, the codes which direct each
profession are tailored differently. The Judicial Code places heavy emphasis on
a judge's off-the-bench behavior. In comparison, the Model Rules stress an
attorney's role within the system by emphasizing the importance of his "official"
or "professional" behavior. 86 Notably, only Chapter 8 of the Model Rules deals
with the conduct of lawyers outside their official roles. By contrast, only Canon
3 of the Judicial Code deals solely with a judge's official responsibilities.'87
The Appearance of Impropriety Standard is an integral part of the Judicial
Code because of the differing roles played by lawyer and judge.' 88 Professor

(La. 1985) (suspending a judge for associating with drug users and prostitutes);
Mississippi Comm'n v. Milling, 651 So. 2d 531, 539-40 (Miss. 1995) (removing a judge
for living with a fugitive from another state and for dismissing the fugitive warrant
against him); In re Blackman, 591 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991) (reprimanding judge for
attending a picnic hosted by a convicted criminal); In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 579 (Pa.
1992) (stating that the Code "forbids or requires acts neither forbidden nor required by
ordinary citizens, or even attorneys subject to other ethical restrictions"); Abramson,
supra note 5, at 954. See generally Frank Wozniak, Annotation, Consorting With or
MaintainingSocial Relations With CriminalFigureAs Groundsfor DisciplinaryAction
Against Judge, 15 A.L.R. 5th 923 (1996).

181. Abramson, supra note 5, at 963.
182. Kaufman, supranote 177, at 3.
183. Judge Kaufman noted that "[p]ossessed of neither the purse nor the sword, it
depends primarily on the willingness of members of society to follow its mandates."
Kaufman, supra note 177, at 3.
184. See Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279, 284 (7th Cir.) (observing the difficulty
in separating a judge's behavior on the bench from his actions outside the courtroom),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037 (1972).
185. See Holland, supra note 155, at 732.

186.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Preamble (1997).

187. See Holland, supra note 155, at 733.
188. See Andrew L. Kaufman, JudicialEthics: The Less-Often Asked Questions,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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Holland characterized the lawyer's role as primarily a functional role; that is, he
is a conduit between the individual and the system. 89 Accordingly, the Model
Rules regulate the relationship between the attorney and the client.' 90 By
contrast, Professor Holland notes that the judge serves both a functional and
symbolic role.' 9' For example, judges have the duty to act as neutral
decision-makers in our adversary system.' 92 Additionally, "judges are the
embodiment of the judicial system."' 93 As symbols of the system, their conduct
is "more likely to effect public perception of the whole justice system."' 94 As
the Judicial Code recognizes, "[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct by judges."'' 95 In sum, the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard requires judges to consider the effect of both their conduct
96
and their perceived conduct on the public's impression of the system.'

64 WASH. L. REv. 851, 854 (1989) (concluding that the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard is the "basic rule of the Code of Conduct, the one to which all other rules are
mere commentary").
189. See Holland, supra note 155, at 733.
190. See Hazard, supra note 73, at 1246 (noting that the three ideals enforced in the
Model Rules are confidentiality, loyalty and candor to the tribunal).
191. See Holland, supra note 155, at 733. The preamble to the Model Code of
JudicialConduct describes judges as the "symbol of government under the rule of law."
See Harris, supra note 2, at 792 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble
(1990)).
192. An essential element of the adversary system is a neutral, passive tribunal. See
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
ProsecutorsDo Justice,44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 85 (1991). The underlying assumption of
the system is that the two sides to a controversy will present their case to a fact finder
who has no demonstrable bias or knowledge of the facts. See Roberta K. Flowers, A
Code of Their Own: Updatingthe Ethics Codes to Include the Non-AdversarialRoles of
Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 942 (1996). In order to ensure this
impartiality, the judge takes no initiative to define the issues, to elicit evidence or to
investigate unchartered defenses. See id.; see also Howard T. Markey, Professionalism
in the PracticeofLaw: A Symposium on Civility andJudicialEthics in the 1990s: A Need
for ContinuingEducation in JudicialEthics, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 647, 648 n.4 (1994)
(concluding that within our adversary system the court should be able to rely on the
lawyers to present the issues and the applicable law fairly and fully).
193. Holland, supra note 155, at 733. See Harris, supra note 2, at 792
(characterizing judges as the "embodiment of the process").
194. Harris, supra note 2, at 792. See generallyDeborah Hellman, The Importance
ofAppearing Principled,37 ARIz. L. REV. 1108 (1995) (discussing the need for courts
to consider the appearance of the system before overruling precedent).

195.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 2(A) cmt. [1] (1990).

196. See Stephen M. Simon & Maury S. Landman, JudicialEthics Simulation
Based Training,58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323, 329 (1996) (noting that even when a
judge's action can be justified as in the interest ofjudicial efficiency or as an action in
good faith, the courts conclude that an appearance of impropriety may result in a
"diminution of public confidence").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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C. The Courts Apply the Standardto Judges
The standard applied by most courts is whether, in the given circumstances,
a reasonable person would perceive the act or conduct with suspicion. The
Judicial Code requires that the court consider "whether the conduct would create
in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."19 7 The
term "appearance" is to be viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable person
rather than from the standpoint of parties or witnesses to the misconduct. 98 This
objective standard is preferable to a subjective standard for several reasons.
First, the use of an objective standard attempts to weed out insignificant risks of
impropriety. Judge Easterbrook observed: "Because some people see goblins
behind every tree, a subjective approach would approximate automatic
disqualification. A reasonable observer is unconcemed about trivial risks; there
is always some risk.... ."9 9 For this reason, Judge Easterbrook concluded the
search was for the possibility of impropriety which was "substantially out of the
ordinary.',200 Additionally, the reasonable person standard has long been used
in the legal context and is therefore a familiar standard to judges.2 ' Finally, this
standard reflects the public's view. This is consistent with the purpose of the
rule, which is to protect the public's perception. °2
Courts consider all the circumstances in determining whether the conduct
would cause suspicion in the reasonable person.2 3 Accordingly, courts have
rejected an "uninformed or misinformed person standard. ' 2° Additionally, the
ABA rejected as part of the 1990 commentary to Canon 2(A) the notion that
"[i]n exercising discretion in his or her personal conduct, a judge should
consider the conduct from the perspective of a person who knows only what is

197. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT

Canon 2(A) cmt. [2] (1990).

198. hI re Foster, 318 A.2d 523, 533-34 (Md. 1974).
199. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); See Abramson, supra note 5,
at 954 n.24.

200. Inre Mason, 916 F.2d at 386.
201. See Martineau, supra note 154, at 243.
202. See Abramson, supra note 5, at 954 n.24; Martineau, supra note 154, at 243
(concluding that such a standard is important in "maintaining public confidence in and

respect for the judicial system"); cf In re Cunningham, 456 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (1982)
(noting that "to the extent that... [the] misconduct consisted of creating the appearance
of impropriety, it is of some moment that the possible perception of this improper conduct
was limited to the eyes of one person only").
203. See, e.g., In re Greenberg, 318 A.2d 740, 741 (Pa. 1974) (stating that "it is our
duty to consider the totality of all the circumstances when determining questions
pertaining to professional and judicial discipline").
204. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 582-83 (Pa. 1992); see also In re Mason, 916
F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (characterizing the standard as how things appear to the
"well-informed thoughtful observer").
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apparent."2 5 As Justice Rehnquist observed, such a standard would "cut [too]
broadly. ' '2°r Furthermore, a standard that did not require consideration of all the
circumstances could lead to "false appearances of impropriety [being]
manufactured with ease by anyone with personal or political animus toward a
judge."2 7 Because misinformed or uninformed persons may assign guilt where
none exists, courts have required the appearance of impropriety to be judged
based on the totality of the circumstances. 0 8
The Appearance of Impropriety Standard requires judges who are
attempting to comply with the standard, as well as those who are attempting to
enforce the standard, to define what is improper. Justice Arthur Goldberg
observed that the Canon is "unbelievably ambiguous." 2' Courts have attempted
to focus inquiries on whether the conduct in question legitimately reflects the
judge's ability to act in his official capacity. '0 As Professor Lubet suggested,
"the proper inquiry is not whether the act is moral or immoral .... Rather, we
must ask how the act reflects upon the central components of the judge's ability
to do the job for which he or she has been empowered: fairness, independence,
and respect for the public." '' The courts have been careful to limit the
application of this standard to actions which reflect the jurist's professional
integrity. 2 2 Although this standard is necessarily vague, it clearly rejects both

205. Abramson, supra note 5, at 956 n.24.
206. William H. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About JudicialEthics, 28 THE
REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 694, 701 (1973). Justice Rehnquist
suggests that if an appearance of impropriety embraced a situation where the facts were
partially known by the reasonable person, "a judge named Jones [would be prevented]
from presiding at a trial of a defendant named Jones, even though they were totally
unrelated, since it would be possible from simply reading the docket entries to conclude
that they were related to one another." Id.
207. In re Larsen, 616 A.2d at 583.
208. See In re Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473, 480 (Pa. 1988); Abramson, supra note
5, at 954 n.24.
209. See Abramson, supranote 5, at 954 n.23; Steven Lubet, JudicialImpropriety:
Love, Friendship,Free Speech, and OtherIntemperate Conduct, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 379,
399 (lamenting the lack of guidance to judges in this standard).
210. See In re Hendrix, 701 P.2d 841, 845 (Ariz. 1985) (censuring a judge for
entering exparte order which appeared to favor his courtroom clerk); In re Hocking, 546
N.W.2d 234, 245-46 (Mich. 1996) (suspending a judge for caustic comments and
personal attacks toward an attorney in a divorce hearing); In re Laster, 274 N.W.2d 742,
745 (Mich. 1979) (publicly reprimanding judge due to appearance of favoritism in
granting exparte a bail bondsman's petition to set aside forfeiture in 58 cases).
211. Lubet, supra note 209, at 386. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 581 (Pa.
1992).
212. See In re Glancey, 542 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1988); In re Cunningham, 538

A.2d at 480.
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standard of mere legality [and] the rigid approach of strict
the "overly' 21permissive
3
moralism.
Although the standard has been criticized as being vague and ambiguous,
it has remained a viable part of the Judicial Code. Its perseverance reflects the
continued belief that courts cannot operate without the confidence and trust of
the public. The same considerations that underlie the standard in the Judicial
Code apply to the prosecuting attorney.1 4
IV. THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD AND
PROSECUTORS
A. The Quasi-JudicialRole of the Prosecutor
The trial process has been referred to as a battle of adversaries in which
lawyers meet to fight for the rights of their clients. 215 However, within the
criminal arena, the prosecutor serves a vastly different function than does the
defense attorney. 6 Whereas the private attorney's primary obligation is to
protect a client's interest, 217 the prosecutor faces a dual role-that of advocate

213. Steven Lubet, JudicialEthics and PrivateLives, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 995
(1985). See also In re Larsen, 616 A.2d at 582 (rejecting the "opposite extremes of
subjective propriety and mere legality") (citations omitted).
214. See Boyan, supranote 82, at 1385; Kaufman, supranote 177, at 5 (concluding
that the term "appearance of impropriety" applies to government lawyers and judges
because of their responsibility to the public).
215. James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Rights to Counsel
Against Informants: Truth, FairPlay, and the Massiah Doctrine,22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1, 65 (1988); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 135, at 567 (indicating that "battlelike
characteristics that have survived in trials are atavistic emergences of the human qualities
that the social arrangement of trials was meant to displace"). Judge Frankel maintains
that during trials the "pervasive air of combat" surrounds the judge, forcing him into the
role of "combatant with a shifting but seemingly endless series of opponents." MARVIN
E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 46-47 (1980).
216. See Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton ET FILS. S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 826
(1987) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A prosecutor occupies a
unique role in our criminal justice system."); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218
(1958) ("The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client."); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1557 (1981)
(observing that certain accepted practices of defense counsel are impermissible for
prosecutors); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975) (asserting that the behavior of a criminal defense attorney is
"amoral" and distinguishable from the role of other lawyers).
217. The defense attorney's central role is to serve as an advocate for his client.
One commentator stated: "The legal profession's basic narrative ...pictures the lawyer
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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for the government and administrator ofjustice.2 The prosecutor serves a role
in between that of the private attorney and the judge. She is required to
zealously represent her client, the government, and the public 2 19 -a role closely
akin to that of the defense attorney. On the other hand, she must "put ahead of
partisan success [the] observance of the law. ' 220 She must protect society's
values by prosecuting and convicting criminals while attempting to ensure that

as a partisan agent acting with the sanction of the Constitution to defend a private party
against the government." Hazard, supranote 73, at 1244. Lord Brougham, in his defense
of Queen Caroline before the House of Lords in 1820, eloquently articulated the defense
attorney's role:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others.
2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 182 1), quoted in Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The MoralFoundationsof the Lawyer-ClientRelation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1060 n.I (1976).
Other commentators have argued that Lord Brougham's definition of the defense
counsel's role is too narrow. See generally William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal
Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993). Judge Marvin Frankel lamented that "Lord
Brougham was wrong; we should be less willing to fight the world and ...

more

concerned to save our own souls." Quoted in In re Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 868 P.2d
419, 437 (Haw. 1994) (Levinson J., concurring) (urging all attorneys to be more
"positively concerned... with the pursuit of truth").
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997); see also
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.1(b), 1 (c) (2d
ed. 1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS] (stating that the duty of the prosecutor is "to seek

justice, not merely to convict"); John S. Edwards, ProfessionalResponsibilitiesof the
FederalProsecutor, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 511 (1983) (describing the prosecutor's
dual role as a zealous advocate who "must temper his zeal with a recognition that his
broader responsibilities are to seek justice"); George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical
and EthicalProblems ofProsecutingPublic Officials,36 MD. L. REV. 5, 7 (1976) (noting
that the prosecutor "is both an advocate in the criminal justice system and also an
administrator of that system"); Fuller & Randall, supra note 216, at 1218; Vorenberg,
supra note 216, at 1557 (observing that prosecutors within the adversary system are
"expected to be more (or is it less?) than an adversary").
219. Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton ET FILS. S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 805
(1987) (recognizing the need for a prosecutor to be a zealous advocate).
220. Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1352 (8th Cir. 1990). Cf Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 656
(1986) (arguing that trial prosecutor should present the "strongest argument" for
conviction); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidancefrom the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1973) (urging that
prosecutors act primarily as zealous advocates).
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no innocent person is wrongly convicted. 22' This dual mission has prompted
several commentators and courts to refer to the prosecutor's role as quasijudicial.222 As the Louisiana Supreme Court wrote: "The district attorney is a
quasi-judicial officer. He represents the State, and the State demands no victims.
It seeks justice only, equal and impartial justice, and it is as much the duty of the
district attorney to see that no innocent man suffers as it is to see that no guilty
man escapes. 223
In keeping with her quasi-judicial position, the prosecutor owes allegiance
to a broad set of societal values.224 She must avoid the role of a "partisan eager
to convict, and must deal fairly with the accused and other participants in the
trial. 225 Further, she must also recognize that no single individual or
constituency is her client. 226 For example, "[c]onsider the constituencies that the

221. See WOLFRAM, supra note 135, at 759; Fuller & Randall, supra note 216, at
1218 ("The freedom elsewhere wisely granted to partisan advocacy must be severely
curtailed if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly discharged.").
222. See WOLFRAM, supra note 135, at 759 (asserting that a "prosecutor's role is
much nearer that of ajudicial officer than that of partisan advocate"); John D. Bessler,
The PublicInterest and the UnconstitutionalityofPrivateProsecutors,47 ARK. L. REV.
511, 544 (1994); Zacharias, supra note 192, at 56-65 (discussing the ethical duty of
prosecutors to do justice); Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept ofPrivate
Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754, 792 n.193 (1976) (citing several cases where
prosecutors have been described as "quasi-judicial"); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) ("It is the functional comparability of theirjudgments to those
of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as
'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being termed 'quasi-judicial' as well.");
State v. Chambers, 524 P.2d 999, 1002 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that a "district
attorney is a part of the judicial system of the state and is a quasi-judicial officer"); State
v. Moss, 376 S.E. 2d 569, 574 (W. Va. 1988).
223. State v. Tate, 171 So. 108, 112 (La. 1936) (upholding the recusal of a
prosecutor because he had an interest in the case).
224. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 218-20 (1988).
225. Moss, 376 S.E.2d at 574 (observing that the prosecutor's duty to avoid
overzealousness is especially important in cases involving serious offenses where the jury
is apt to be predisposed against the defendant). See Chambers, 524 P.2d at 1001
(recognizing the prosecutor's duty to see that the defendant is afforded a fair trial).
226. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,395 (1987) (holding that
the prosecutor represents the public and not the police); see also Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478, 485-87 (1991) (denying the prosecutor absolute immunity for advice given to
police). See generallyJames Harvey III, Loyalty in GovernmentLitigation: Department
ofJustice RepresentationofAgency Clients, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1569 (1996)
(recognizing the potential clients of the Department of Justice to include (1) the public
interest, (2) the government as a whole, (3) agency officials, (4) the agency itself, (5) the
President, and (6) the Attorney General); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the
Government Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1979) (discussing the identity of possible
clients for the prosecutor); E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital Punishment: A
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prosecutor must appease: the crime victims, law enforcement agencies, the
227
prosecutor's political office, and the elusive concepts of 'truth' and 'justice.'
Additionally, at times,
the prosecutor must protect not only her own case, but her
228
opponent's as well.
As the government's spokesperson, the prosecutor brandishes tremendous
authority and discretion in directing investigations, 229 defining the crimes to be
charged,230 affecting punishment, and deciding whether or not to prosecute at
all."3 She possesses virtually unquestioned, discretionary power.232 In fact, the
prosecutor has been described as "the single most powerful figure in the
administration of criminal justice."" One commentator noted that centralization

Prosecutor'sProspective,79 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 663 (1996) (describing the relationship
between prosecutors and police); Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest
in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1414 (1981) (listing entities that the
government lawyer must consider, including (1) her supervisor, (2) the governmental
office, (3) the government, and (4) the public interest).
227. Flowers, supra note 192, at 931.
228. Flowers, supra note 192, at 931. See also Zacharias, supra note 192, at 66-74
(discussing the prosecutor's responsibility to "do justice" when opposing counsel is
ineffective). As noted in Blair v. Annontrout, "[i]n criminal cases, the government must
wear two hats. The prosecutor must act as an advocate, although he or she is repeatedly
cautioned to put ahead of partisan success the observance of the law." 916 F.2d 1310,
1352 (8th Cir. 1990).
229. See generally United Stated v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 670 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of the indictment), rev'd, 855 F.2d 621 (9th Cir.
1988); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992)
(discussing the trend of prosecutors becoming increasingly more involved in
investigations).
230. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859 (1985) (recognizing the long
standing rule that prosecutor's have broad discretion in charging decisions); United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (stating that a court cannot interfere with a
prosecutor's decision to bring charges), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); see also
Gershman, supra note 229, at 409 (arguing that the most extreme example of the
prosecutor's discretion is in the area of charging decisions in capital cases). See generally
Charles J. Yeager & Lee Hargrave, The Powerof the Attorney General to Supercede a
DistrictAttorney: Substance, Procedure& Ethics, 51 LA. L. REV. 733, 742 (1991).
231. See Robert L. Misner, RecastingProsecutorialDiscretion,86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (1996).
232. See Wayne A. Logan, A Proposed Check on the ChargingDiscretion of
Wisconsin Prosecutors,1990 Wis. L. REV. 1695, 1695; Catherine Lowe, Project, TwentySecond Annual Review of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts
ofAppeals 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1029-32 (1993).
233. Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillem, Taming the Dragon:An Administrative
Lawfor ProsecutorialDecisionMaking, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473,477 (1976). See also
Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.
669, 672. Other areas of prosecutorial discretion include the discretion to arrest, grant
immunity, plea bargain, and make bail and sentencing recommendations.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

33

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 3
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 63

of power into the prosecutor's office made the prosecutor the "preeminent actor
'
in the system."234
The prosecutor acts not only in a powerful functional role, but also in a
symbolic role, much like a judge. One court defined the objective of the
prosecutor to be like that of the court-to seek simple justice.235 She enjoys a
position supported by the awesome power of the government.236 In Berger v.
United States, 237 the Supreme Court characterized prosecutors, not as ordinary
parties to a controversy, but as representatives of a sovereignty.23
The
prosecutor exemplifies the government as a whole, as its representative. She
therefore can affect the public's perception of the government and of the
criminal justice system.
As a representative of governmental law enforcement, the prosecutor is the
symbol of how the system works. Professor Alschuler has noted that when
"lawless enforcement of the law is perpetrated by the officials most definitely
responsible for law observance, the natural result is public resentment of the
entire legal process." 23 9 The prosecutor thus symbolizes law enforcement and
the criminal justice system in this country. Therefore, "[w]here the prosecutor
is recreant to the trust implicit in his office, he undermines confidence, not
only
24
in his profession, but in government and the very ideal ofjustice itself.
B. The Appearance of FairDealing
As a quasi-judicial officer and a minister ofjustice, the prosecutor affects
public confidence in the legal system. As noted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, "[c]onfidence in government depends to a large extent on confidence in
the honesty and integrity of its employees., 24' This court observed: "[B]ecause

234. Misner, supra note 231, at 718.
235. See O'Neill v. State, 207 N.W. 280, 281 (Wis. 1926).
236. See WOLFRAM, supra note 135, at 460 (noting that prosecutors "have available
a terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information").
237. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). For a discussion of Berger, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand TrialJudges, 50 TEX. L. REv. 629, 635-36
(1972).
238. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. As representatives of the government, the court
noted that the United States Attorney's "obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all." Id. The court further stated that the government's
interest in a criminal case was not to win, but to see that justice was done. Id.
239. Alschuler, supra note 237, at 633.
240. Fuller & Randall, supra note 216, at 1218.
241. In re Petition for Review of Opinion No. 569 of the Advisory Comm. on
Prof'I Ethics, 511 A.2d 119, 122 (N.J. 1986). See also Boyan, supra note 82, at 1386
(observing that although the Appearance of Impropriety Standard should not be applied
to private lawyers, the application of this standard to public lawyers would increase "the
public's faith in the judicial system").
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government attorneys are invested with the public trust... their conduct must
'
be even more circumspect than the private attorney."242
As noted in a Harvard
Law Review Study on Conflicts of Interest:
[P]otentially improper conduct on the part of a government employee
is more likely to be scrutinized by the public than that of a private
attorney. This is not surprising, since the public is most concerned
with the potential misuse of information and power gained when the
public itself, rather than a private party, is suffering the
consequences.243
To ensure and maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
government, public officials, including prosecutors, must act impartially and
responsibly.244 Government officials must be held to high ethical standards to
make certain their activities are conducted in the public's interest.245
Furthermore, "[g]ovemments have a responsibility to the public to avoid even
the appearance of impropriety and to act to reduce the opportunities and
incentives for unethical behavior by their officials and employees. 246 This is
true of the prosecuting attorney because "an appearance of impropriety on the
part of a government attorney will inevitably harm not only the individual
attorney, but also the entire system of government that allows such improprieties
to take place. A perceived impropriety by the former is inevitably seen as a fault
of both. 247 The requirement of an appearance of fairness standard rests on the
premise that "seeing is believing." That is, if the public sees the process as
unjust or unfair, it will believe it so and lose confidence in the governmental
system. According to David Harris:
The appearance ofjustice will affect public perception of the system's
legitimacy. A system consistently seen as unjust will eventually lose
the allegiance of its citizens. If people perceive the courts as less than
fair decision makers, the moral force courts depend on to ensure
compliance with decisions they make diminishes. 248

242. In re Opinion No. 569, 511 A.2d at 122.
243. Note, supra note 226, at 1416. See In re Opinion No. 569, 511 A.2d at 122.
244. See Deborah L. Markowitz, A Crisisin Confidence: Municipal Officials Under
Fire, 16 VT. L. REv. 579, 580 (1992).
245. Id. See also James Gerstenzang, Bush Promises to Name Special Ethics
Counsel, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1988, at 1 (quoting Vice President George Bush, who
stated: "No one, no institution, no body of government should be above the law. This

is not the American Way.").
246. Markowitz, supra note 244, at 580.
247. Note, supra note 226, at 1416.
248. Harris, supra note 2, at 790.
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C. The Needfor an EthicalProvision
Unfortunately, prosecutorial misconduct, which undermines the public
perception that the system is fair, is not a rarity. As noted by one commentator,
"[c]ourts and commentators have expressed frustration and concern over the
frequent occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct., 249 The cause of increased
prosecutorial misconduct has been debated by commentators. Professor Earle
noted that "institutional and political pressures combine to create tremendous
incentives for the prosecutor to overlook her quasi-judicial obligation. 25 As E.
Michael McCann, the District Attorney for Milwaukee County, explained:
"[P]ressures on the government... to 'do something,' can overwhelm even
those of good conscience .... ,
Institutional pressures include the fear that
supervisors will gauge an attorney's performance based on her conviction
record. 2 Additionally, the prosecutor must constantly guard against a "working
assumption of guilt.

'253

This mindset results from both spending considerable

time with victims and witnesses, most of whom suggest the defendant's guilt
rather than innocence; and a perception that the defendant is given advantages
which send the prosecution into battle with a blunted sword. 4

249. Michael T. Fisher, Note, HarmlessError,ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Due
Process: There's More to Due Processthan the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298,

1322 (1988) (arguing that the way to protect defendant's due process rights is to reverse
convictions for prosecutorial misconduct).
250. Elizabeth L. Earle, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the
Identification ofProsecutorialRacism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1219 (1992) (noting

that political pressures can cause justice to "take a backseat"). See also Dick v. Scroggy,
882 F.2d 192, 196 (6th Cir. 1989) (observing that "politically ambitious prosecutors" are

not "uncommon"); J. Lyndal Hagemeyer, Note, Statements by ProsecutingAttorneys to
Juries Which Demand Improper Considerationsfor Verdict or Punishment,39 VA. L.

REv. 85, 86 (1953) (noting that pressures on the prosecutors can lead to calculated
improper statements to the jury).
251. McCann, supra note 226, at 675 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
252. See Welsh S. White, A Proposalfor Reform of the Plea BargainingProcess,

119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 445 (1971) (quoting a trial prosecutor's assessment that a
prosecution's willingness to take a weak case to trial depends "on his position in the
office at the time of trial"). See generallyKenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial": When
ProsecutorsKeep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1996)

(discussing problems with the use of convictions records in performance evaluations);
Earle, supra note 250; Donald Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The
Control ofProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 43 n.39;
253. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI.

L. REv. 50, 64 n.42 (1968). One commentator called this a "conviction psychology."
Earle, supra note 250, at 1219.
254. Earle, supra note 250, at 1219.
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Although standards for the conduct of prosecutors exist, they have failed
to diminish prosecutor misconduct. 255 Richard Rosen found that the research
reveals that disciplinary charges have been "brought infrequently under 'the
' 56
applicable rules and that meaningful sanctions have been applied only rarely. 2
Bennett L. Gershman reported that he reviewed "[l]iterally hundreds of truly
egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct," 25 7 and that none of these

resulted in punishment of the prosecutor by either his superiors or the
instances
25 8
bar.

Several factors may contribute to the lack of formal discipline of
prosecutors. One commentator suggests the lack of discipline may stem from
the prosecutor's "standing, prestige, political power and close affiliation with the
bar., 219 Other reasons asserted for the lack of discipline include the following:
a hostile attitude on the part of the judiciary toward claims of prosecutorial
misconduct, based on the relationship between the judiciary and the prosecutor's
office; 260 difficulty in obtaining evidence to successfully pursue violations; and

lack of expertise in the criminal law area which causes disciplinary bodies to be
reluctant to judge prosecutorial conduct.26' However, one explanation for the

"255. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8
cmt. (1997). See
Generally STANDARDS, supra note 218; NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS (Nat'l Dist. Attorney Assoc. 2d ed. 1991)
256. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 693 (1987).
257. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 13-2 n.4 (6th ed.
1991).
258. See id. (stating that attorney disciplinary sanctions are so rarely imposed as
to make their "use virtually a nullity"); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS JR., PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT § 13.15, at 599 (1985) (disciplinary sanctions against prosecuting attorneys
are the exception, not the rule); Alschuler, supra note 237, at 673 ("[C]ourts have
sometimes exhibited a strange hesitancy to subject prosecutors to the rules that are
applicable to other lawyers."). Professor Rory Little undertook a "entirely unscientific
and possibly incomplete" search of roughly 600,000 reported state disciplinary decisions
since 1963 and found only 18 decisions involving the discipline of prosecutors in their
official capacity. Joan Rogers, ConferenceReport, 66 U.S. L. WKLY. 2014, 2014 (1997).
Additionally, commentators have noted that on the rare occasions when prosecutors
are disciplined, the sanctions imposed amount to little more than a "slap on the wrist."
Rosen, supra note 256, at 693; see also Misner, supra note 231, at 736 (noting the court's
"hands off' policy in sanctioning prosecutors). See generally Walter Steele, Jr.,
UnethicalProsecutorsand IadequateDiscipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1981).
259. GERSHMAN, supra note 257, at ix.
260. See GERSHMAN, supra note 257, § 12.4, at 12-13, 12-14 (describing the close
relationship prosecutors enjoy with the judiciary).
261. See Bruce A. Green, PolicingFederalProsecutors:Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 70 (1995). Professor
Wolfram suggests that the reluctance of the disciplinary agencies may stem from a
concern that complaints against prosecutors may be motivated by politics or resentment
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lack of discipline may be that many of the actions of prosecutors do not violate
ethical requirements. These same actions, however, appear to be improper; thus,
they negatively impact the system by appearing to be unfair.
To encourage prosecutors to consider whether their actions appear proper,
the Appearance of Impropriety Standard should be included in Rule 3.8 of the
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct.262 The standard should appear not only
in the rule, but also in the comment section. If the standard is included in the
rule, it can be used as a basis for discipline.263 Additionally, the standard should
be explained in the comment section to clarify the standard.
A suggested section follows: 2"
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(h) refrainfrom conduct that has the appearanceof
impropriety.
COMMENT:
[1] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate. A
prosecutoras a minister ofjustice must seek to
maintain the integrity of the criminal justice
system by refrainingfrom not only improprietyin
his professionallife, but also the appearanceof
impropriety. The prosecutor's professional
conduct will be judged by determining whether
his actions would create in reasonableminds 265
a doubt that the prosecutor is acting fairly,
competently, andjustly in light of the knowledge
of all relevant circumstances that a reasonable
inquiry would disclose.2"

resulting from convictions. See WOLFRAM, supra note 135, § 13.10.2, at 761.
262. See Zacharias, supra note 192, at 49-50 (suggesting the need for specific
ethical directives).
263. Professor DiPippa argued that a "complete code would not omit either
enforcement of the minimum duties or the encouragement of high ideals." John M. A.
DiPippa, Lon Fuller,the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303, 335
(1996).
264. The sections in italics are the proposed additions to the existing rule.
265. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
266. The Delaware and Florida Codes of Judicial Conduct include this language.
See Abramson, supra note 5, at 953 n.15.
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Opponents to the application of the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to
prosecutors may assert that, because a "prosecutor's sole duty is to do justice,"
she has no financial incentives to commit unethical acts.267 Others opine that
municipal codes of conduct for public officials are not necessary because the
"political process will oust officials whose conduct is less than exemplary."268
However, relying on public pressure and the lack of financial incentives will not
ensure that the prosecutor acts either fairly or appears to act fairly. Furthermore,
due to the prosecutor's extreme power26 9 over the criminal justice system, her
conduct must be gauged more carefully than that of a private attorney. An
ethical provision will provide the mechanism to enforce the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard and will encourage self-reflection.
An ethical rule delineating the Appearance of Impropriety Standard would
allow courts to sanction, and disciplinary bodies to punish, prosecutorial conduct
which appears to be improper. Prosecutorial conduct often falls outside the rules
of ethics because the rules were drafted and primarily developed to address and
regulate the attomey-client relationship.27 0 At the heart of the Model Rules is the
assumption "that the world is composed of two groups, clients and
non-clients. ' 27' The prosecutor does not have a client. Therefore, her actions are
not usually addressed by current ethical codes. 27 2 However, her actions may still
appear to be improper as failing to seek justice and truth. Such conduct could
be corrected by the presence of a rule which would make that reproach possible.
In addition to using the rule to discipline or sanction, the rule could also
provide a mechanism for the necessary soul-searching and self-regulation
required of prosecutors.2 Professor Zacharias stressed that the promotion of
introspection is one of the most important' purposes of a professional ethics

267. Arizona ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 908 P.2d 37, 43 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a screening mechanism will prevent disqualification of an entire
prosecution's office because there is no "financial incentive to obtain prohibited
information"); see also State v. Pennington, 851 P.2d 494, 498 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding that prosecutors have no financial incentives to violate a court order separating
them from a case); Earle, supra note 250, at 1219.
268. Markowitz, supra note 244, at 596. See Earle, supra note 250, at 1219.
269. Young v. United States ex. rel. Vuitton ET FILS. S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 813
(1987) (observing that the "citizen's primary adversary... is armed with expansive
powers and wide-ranging discretion").
270. See Flowers, supra note 192, at 952-74 (discussing the adversarial nature of
the ethics codes and their lack of application to prosecutors during the investigation of
the criminal case).
271. Lawry, supra note 226, at 629.
272. See Flowers, supra note 192, at 965; Amy R. Mashbum, Professionalismas
ClassIdeology: Civility Codes and BarHierarchy,28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 666 (1994)
(observing that there are findamental differences among lawyers which "flourish beneath
a deceptively cohesive surface").
273. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalCodes: Theory, Practice,
and the Paradigmof ProfessionalEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 223, 259 (1993).
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code. 7
The role of professional lawyer requires introspection. 25 One
commentator noted that "[t]rue ethical decisions allow for an individual to weigh
the multitude of factors that go into moral decision making."27 6 To this end, the
ethics codes encourage self-inspection. The Preamble to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states: "[A] lawyer is also guided by personal
conscience. '277 Similarly, the Code ofProfessionalResponsibility's Preamble
declares that "each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone
against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum
standards. 278 Introspection is essential in those areas where the likelihood of
detection or discipline are negligible, 279 and where it promotes the appearance
ofjustice. 20 Self-regulation and reflection are imperative because prosecutors
are allowed enormous discretion to make decisions that are unreviewable. 28' The

274. Id.
275. See John J. Flynn, ProfessionalEthics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976
WASH. U. L. Q. 429,436-40 (lamenting that the ethics codes fail to recognize the lawyer's
duty to himself); cf William Simon, EthicalDiscretionin Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1083-84 (1988) (arguing that lawyers must exercise reflective judgment in deciding
whether to assert a claim).
276. DiPippa, supra note 263, at 308.
277. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1997).
278. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (198 1).
279. See Fisher, supra note 224, at 197 (distinguishing the role of the prosecutor
at trial when the adversary system works as a guard against excess from other
prosecutorial behavior which is not controlled by the adversary system).
280. See Deborah L. Rhodes, Wzy the ABA Bothers: A FunctionalPerspective on
ProfessionalCodes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 707 (observing that ethics codes "promote the
appearance and reality of justice, which both ultimately redound to the benefit of the
profession"). See generally Gifford, supra note 252.
281. See text accompanying notes 203-08; see also Misner, supranote 231, at 74163. Robert Misner identified three trends which have promoted the historical discretion
and authority of the prosecutor: (1) criminal codes with overlapping crimes, (2) increase
in crime reporting that has lead to the need to rely on plea bargaining, and (3) sentencing
guidelines which have eliminated the judge's sentencing discretion and placed sentencing
in the hands of the prosecutor. Misner, supranote 231, at 741-63. Some of the reasons
often cited for the prosecutor's extensive discretion in charging decisions are: (1) the
separation of powers doctrine, (2) limited resources, (3) the impossibility of enforcing all
the laws, (4) prosecutorial expertise in many areas that surpasses the court's, and (5) the
need for individualized case analysis and consideration of particular needs of leniency.
See LAWLESS, supra note 258, at 139-40. The Supreme Court has often reaffirmed the
doctrine underlying the prosecutor's discretionary powers. See Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773, 791 (1985) (holding the government, and not the courts, is responsible for
initiating a criminal prosecution, unless the prosecution based its decision on race,
religion, or other arbitrary classifications); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561
(1977) (noting that there is no constitutional right to plea bargain); Olyer v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448,456 (1962) (finding no equal protection claim based on selective prosecution);
see also Gifford, supra note 252, at 53 (distinguishing plea bargaining from other
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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prosecutor must be provided with guidance on how to exercise that discretion in
a proper way. Justice Brietel framed the challenge as, "not how to eliminate or
reduce discretion, but how to control it so as to avoid the unequal, the arbitrary,
the discriminatory, and the oppressive., 282 An Appearance of Impropriety
Standard would provide the necessary guidance.
V. APPLYING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD TO

WITNESS PREPARATION
The application of the Appearance of Impropriety Standard is particularly
helpful in situations which occur outside the courtroom. Within the courtroom,
the prosecutor's actions can be monitored and guided by judges, the adversary
system, and substantive and ethics laws.283 However, outside the courtroom,
e.g., in the police station, or the witness interview room, the prosecutor must
conduct herself professionally by relying on her own internal compass. The
prosecutor makes many of her contacts with the public outside the courtroom.
Thus, her actions can create a positive or negative impression of the legal
system. In her office, the prosecutor exercises her considerable discretion almost
unfettered by judicial oversight'8 or client control 8 Therefore, the Appearance
of Impropriety Standard is most applicable and useful when considering the
prosecutor's actions outside the courtroom. Witness preparation is one of those
areas.

negotiations because of the prosecution's total discretion). See generallyCox, supra note

79; Uviller, supra note 220.
282. Charles D. Breitel, Controlsin CriminalLaw Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.

427, 427 (1960). See also State v. Karpinski, 285 N.W.2d 729, 735 (Wis. 1979)
(recognizing both the need for prosecutorial discretion to achieve flexibility and
sensitivity and the need to avoid arbitrary, discriminatory, or oppressive results).
283. See Fisher, supranote 224, at 225 (recognizing that the presence of adversarial

safeguards allows the prosecutor to act more like an advocate and less like an impartial
minister ofjustice).
284. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
285. In some respects, the prosecuting attorney is both the advocate and the client.

See People v. Kelly, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1978) (observing "in practical

effect, the public prosecutor functions in dual capacity as both agent and principal, as
both attorney and client"); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS 393 (3d ed. 1992). In pursuing the goals of a criminal case, the

prosecuting attorney need not consult with any private individual. As one commentator
noted, "the only mind the prosecutor must make up is his own." Edwards, supra note
218, at 513 (discussing that prosecutors make decisions normally reserved for the client).

For a discussion of other interests the prosecutor must consider, see supranotes 225-28
and accompanying text.
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A. Witness Preparation: The Profession'sDirty Little Secret28 6
Witness preparation 287 is considered by many to be an essential part of
pretrial preparation. Most American lawyers would scoff at the suggestion that
witness preparation should be prohibited.288 However, this pretrial preparation
is not internationally recognized. In many countries, the trial attorney never
speaks to or prepares any witnesses.289 By contrast,American lawyers assert that

286. See J. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS § 9.04, at 494 (2d
ed. 1992) (reminding his readers that "there is nothing dirty about witness preparation,"
but pointing out that convincing a witness that there is nothing dirty about the procedure
is the lawyer's first task in preparation); John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation,68 TEX.
L. REv. 277, 279 (1989) (calling witness preparation "one of the dark secrets of the legal
profession").
287. Here, witness preparation refers to the method used by a lawyer to discuss the
witness's actual testimony prior to trial. Some practitioners call this process "house
shedding" or "wood shedding," referring to the historical use of carriage houses behind
the courthouse for last minute witness preparation. See JAMES W. MCELHANEY, TRIAL
NOTEBOOK 50 (3d ed. 1994). This Article deals with witness preparation generally and
not the specific preparation of expert witnesses. In many ways, witness preparation does
not differ between experts and lay witnesses. However, because the rules governing
expert witness opinions differ from those governing lay witnesses, there are some rules
of preparation which are unique to experts. For a discussion of expert witness
preparation, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113, 1136.
Witness preparation is distinguished from investigation and discovery. During the
investigation and discovery stage of the case, the lawyer is gathering facts and
determining the strategy of the case. By the time the lawyer is at the pre-trial witness
preparation stage, he should know all the facts of the case better than all the witnesses and
should have determined his trial strategy and theory. See MCELHANEY, supra, at 50;
ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, How TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL §

12.01, at 212-13 (1985) (dividing the preparation into three stages: (1) the preliminary
interview, (2) preparation session, and (3) the rehearsal session). The witness preparation
discussed herein deals with preparing for the testimony of the witness on the stand.
Roberto Aron and Jonathan Rosner have suggested that, in addition to witness preparation
for trial testimony, the advocate should prepare their clients and criminal defendants to
engage in testimony from the counsel table. Id. § 24.09, at 213-18 (Supp. 1997). The
authors suggest a "client's silent participatory theory" in which the client has a non-verbal
conversation with individual jurors, relaying the client's impressions of the testimony.
Id. The authors advocate this method to be ethical and professional even though it is not
subject to cross-examination, part of the trial record, nor even made known to the judge
or opposing counsel. Id. This Article does not discuss the preparation of witnesses for
this type of "testimony."
288. See Riboni v. District Court, 586 P.2d 9, 11 (Colo. 1978) (recognizing that our
system ofjustice encourages witness preparation); Gross, supra note 287, at 1136 ("[O]ur
system of presenting evidence at trial presupposes advance preparation.").
289. See William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crimne Victims in German Courtrooms:
A ComparativePerspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 37, 43 (1996)
(contrasting American witness preparation with the system in Germany, where the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3

42

Flowers: Flowers: What You See Is What You Get:

1998]

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD

witness preparation is a part of their "fundamental
duty of representation and a
2 0
basic element of effective advocacy. 1
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct define competent
representation to include "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.,' 29' The rule, however, does not
refine the definition to include preparation of witnesses. It merely requires the
"use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent
practitioners. 292
Witness preparation helps the lawyer present his case in a clear and
coherent manner.293 For example, the trial lawyer can use witness preparation
"shaping of witness testimony" is considered unethical). In discussing the English system
of witness preparation, Barrister Michael Hill states that the reasori for the English rule
prohibiting barristers from preparing witnesses before trial is to ensure that the witness's
testimony is the "testimony of the witness and not the result of the advocate's
interrogation of the witness in circumstances in which the witness is liable to seek to
adopt the advocate's perception of the events rather than his own recollection." Michael
Hill, Rules of Conductfor Counsel and Judges: A Panel Discussion on English and
American Practices, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 865, 869 (1994). See generally DAVID

(1988) (contrasting the German
system which discourages contact between the witness and attorney).
290. Applegate, supranote 286, at 279; see Riboni,596 P.2d at 11 (acknowledging
the prosecution's duty to prepare witnesses).
291. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997).
292. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. (1997).
293. Professor Wydick suggests several legitimate reasons an advocate engages in
witness preparation:
* to investigate the facts; that is, to find out about the events in question;
* to find out what the witness perceived and can testify to from personal
knowledge;
- to determine how accurately the witness perceived the events and what
conditions may have hindered or assisted his perception;
* to test the witness's memory about what he perceived;
* to discover how certain the witness is about what he remembers;
* to determine adverse or favorable conditions that may have affected the
witness's memory;
- to refresh the witness's memory of events he once remembered but has
since forgotten;
- to find out whether exposure to relevant documents, other items of tangible
or testimonial evidence, or some non-evidentiary stimulus will help refresh the
witness's memory;
* to test the witness's ability to communicate his recollections accurately;
* to find out what the witness means by words or expressions used in his
story;
* to test the witness's truthfulness;
* to wam the witness that his credibility may be attacked and that his past acts
may be exposed in open court;
- to ascertain whether the witness has a good or bad character for truthfulness;
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
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to relieve some of the anxiety of the witness, allowing them to answer questions
in a manner which is understandable to the jury.294 Additionally, the lawyer can
assist the witness in understanding the evidence that is relevant and admissible
as well as evidence which will be excluded. Also, the lawyer can help a witness
recall details that are forgotten due to the passage of time. In sum, most
successful lawyers would not put a significant witness
on the stand unless he had
295
spent at least some time preparing that witness.
On the other hand, some scholars have noted that witness preparation is one
of the dark secrets of trial work.296 Professor David Luban observed: "[T]he
interviewing and preparation of witnesses ...is a practice that, more than almost

- to find out whether the witness has previously been convicted of a crime
that could be used to impeach his credibility;
- to uncover instances of non-criminal conduct that could be used to impeach
the witness's credibility;
* to discover whether the witness's story has been influenced by bias or
prejudice;
* to discover whether the witness's story has been influenced, properly or
improperly, by the statements or conduct of some other person;
• to find out whether the witness has previously made statements that are
either consistent or inconsistent with his present story;
* to test the witness's demeanor in response to various stimuli he may
encounter when he testifies (for example, the witness's likely response to
harsh questioning by a cross-examiner);
- to explain the role of a witness, the obligations imposed by the oath, and the
formality of court proceedings;
- to inform the witness about the physical surroundings in which he will
testify, the persons who will be present, and the logistical details of being a
witness;
; to explain to the witness why he should listen to questions carefully, not
guess, not volunteer information that has not been asked for, be alert to
objections, and the like; to advise the witness about the appropriate attire and
physical appearance in court, distracting mannerisms, inappropriate language
and demeanor, and the effective delivery of testimony.
Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17-18

(1995).
294. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.02, at 492. "The real goal of witness
preparation should be viewed not only as the protection of the witness but as the
destruction of the opponent's cross-examination." KESTLER,supra note 286, § 9.01, at
491.
295. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 7.02, at 82 (asserting "witness
preparation as the most important aspect of trial advocacy"); FRED LANE, GOLDSTEIN
TRIALTECHNIQUE § 11.02, at 7 (1995) (advocating that "[e]very witness, whether lay or
expert, should be interviewed for the purpose of preparing him to be a 'good' witness");
STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY,ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 46 (1993).
296. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 279.
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anything else, gives trial lawyers their reputation as purveyors of falsehoods."297
This is largely because witness preparation routinely takes place in private.
Therefore, many of the ethical issues that might arise within the context of
witness preparation are seldom litigated. Witness manipulation and intimidation
are rarely disciplined or even detected.298 In fact, the majority of cases dealing
with witness preparation deal with overt attempts to suborn perjury.299
Although American lawyers believe that witness preparation is
fundamental 3" to their job, it is rarely taught in law school, is not directly
regulated by ethics codes, and is seldom an issue in training attorneys. 301 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address witness

preparation. The Rules, however, prohibit certain behavior that could manifest
itself during witness preparation. For example, the Rules strictly prohibit the
lawyer from knowingly offering false or perjurious testimony.3 °2 The Model
Rules require that if a lawyer subsequently discovers that information offered to
a tribunal is false, he must correct the false information. 30 3 Additionally, the
Model Rules prohibit "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice." 3°4 However, the Rules do not speak directly to the responsibility of the
lawyer to prevent the witness from using false testimony. As one commentator
explained, "attorneys now have essentially unlimited license to do almost
anything in the process of preparing witnesses short of buying witnesses or

297. LUBAN, supra note 289, at 96. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 279.
298. See Michael Higgins, Fine Line, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 52, 53 (quoting
Stephen Gillers' observation that "changes of unethical witness coaching and suborning

of perjury are extraordinarily difficult to prove").
299. See Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., ProfessionalConduct and the Preparationof
Witnessesfor Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitationsof "Coaching," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 389, 393 (1987).
300. One commentator called witness preparation a "science." See ROBERTO ARON
ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION § 19.06, at 233 (2d ed. 1996).
301. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 279.
302. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1997) (stating
that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false");
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1997) (stating that "[a] lawyer

shall not falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely."); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1997) (explaining that "[ilt is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation").
303. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1997) (requiring
that "[i]f a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures"). This provision to correct the
admission of false testimony applies even if the lawyer's knowledge of the falsity of the
information came from his client and therefore would be confidential under the rules.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 3.3(b) (1997).

304. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1997).
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suborning pejury. '3 5 The lack of special rules, standards, 3 6 or even discussion
about the ethics of witness preparation have resulted in a significant uncertainty
about the boundaries30between
permissible witness preparation and impermissible
7
"coaching.
witness
Courts rarely have attempted to define witness coaching. The Supreme
Court, in Geders v. UnitedStates,3"' recognized that the lawyer must refrain from
improperly influencing a witness's testimony but failed to define what
constitutes improper "coaching., 319 In Geders, the Court held that prohibiting
a defendant from consulting his counsel during an overnight recess violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.31 During
the course of its discussion, the Court found that the rules of witness
sequestration were adopted, in part, to prevent "improper attempts to influence
the testimony in light of the testimony already given. '31' However, the Court
found that improper influence was defined by the disciplinary rules which
govern false testimony. 312
By contrast, some courts have defined proper witness preparation to require
more than merely refraining from encouraging or aiding in perjurious testimony.
For example, the court in State v. McCormick 3 t 3 defined proper witness
preparation as the method of "preparing the witness to give the witness' [sic]
testimony at trial and not the testimony that the attorney has placed in the
witness' [sic] mouth., 314 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit defined improper
witness coaching as attempts to direct "a witness's testimony in such a way as
to have it conform with, conflict with, or supplement the testimony of other
witnesses.315

305. Gross, supra note 287, at 1137.
306. Neither the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the National District
Attorney Association's National Standards for Prosecutors address witness preparation.
307. See Higgins, supra note 298, at 53 (noting that "the line where legitimate
witness preparation crosses into unethical coaching is fuzzy"); Robert S. Thompson,
Recission, DisciplinedInferences and the Adversary Process, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 725,
770 (1991) (finding the line between witness preparation and witness coaching both
"fuzzy and shifting").
308. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
309. Id. at 80.
310. See id. at 91.
311. Id. at87.
312. See id. at 90 n.3.
313. 259 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1979).
314. Id. at 882.
315. Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103, 1110 (11 th Cir. 1986).
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B. Methods of Witness Preparation
Prior to the witness's testimony, the lawyer-may prepare the witness
through several methods. These methods of witness preparation can be divided
into the following three categories: preparing the form of the testimony, which
includes imparting general and case-specific information to the witness;
preparing the content of the testimony, which includes gathering information
about the testimony; and refreshing the witness's memory.
1. Preparing the Form of the Testimony
a. Giving GeneralInformation
An important part of preparing witnesses is imparting general information
316

about testifying. The lawyer explains the court proceedings to the witness.
The attorney may also describe the courtroom and where everyone will be seated
during the proceedings, including the judge, the parties, and the witnesses.313 7
The witness may also be taken to observe the layout of the

courtroom.

11

Additionally, the lawyer may explain the procedure regarding direct
examination, cross-examination, and objections. 31 9 For example, the lawyer
could explain terms the witness may not understand. 320 The literature is

316. See THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIALTECHNIQUES 476 (4th ed. 1996) (instructing
the lawyer to "prepare the witness for the procedural and evidentiary rules that govern his
testimony"); TANFORD, supra note 13, at 261 (suggesting that making the witness familiar
with the courtroom assists the witness in communicating effectively with the jury). Lane
advises the attorney to describe the characteristics of the judge and opposing counsel for
the witness; for example, the attorney should tell the witness if the judge is a "stickler"
on demeanor and decorum in her courtroom. LANE, supra note 295, § 11.19, at 23.
317. In a criminal case, the prosecutor must consider whether the witness should
be informed of the location of the defendant in the courtroom. One court assumed that
informing the witness of the defendant's location was suggestive, but upheld the
defendant's conviction, finding that the identification was reliable under all the
circumstances. See United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 745 (1st Cir. 1994); see also
People v. Roybal, 775 P.2d 67, 71 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no prosecutorial

misconduct where the prosecutor explained to the victim prior to trial that the defendant
did not have a tatoo on his arm, although the victim had previously described her attacker
as having a tatoo); State v. Hensley, 608 So. 2d 664, 669 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
mistrial unnecessary when prosecution showed a single picture of defendant just prior to
the trial). See generally Evan J. Mandery, Due Process Considerationsof In-Court
Identifications,60 ALB. L. REV. 389 (1996).
318. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 261.
319. See MAUET, supra note 316, at 475; TANFORD, supra note 13, at 261
(suggesting that a witness be informed of the order of questioning and the need to refrain
from answering a question when an objection is asserted).
320. See ARON & ROSNER, supranote 287, § 11.29, at 295 (listing legal terms that
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abundant with lists of information that should be given to witnesses.32 This
information can be given orally during the preparation conference, or in writing
to the witness, prior to testimony at trial.322
In addition, instructions given to witnesses may include general behavioral
suggestions. 323 For example, the witness may be instructed on how to dress.324
Further, he may be advised to avoid exhibiting annoying habits and distracting
mannerisms. 3 The witness could be told to use language that is understandable
and acceptable to the jury. 326 The lawyer may also discuss with the witness his
or her demeanor while testifying.327 Most lawyers agree that the most important

may need to be explained).
321. See JOSEPH KELNER & FRANCIS E. MCGOVERN, SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION
TECHNIQUES: STUDENT EDITION § 8.03, at 8-16 to 8-18 (1981); Applegate, supra note

286, at 298 n.95.
1 322. See RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL
PRACTICE § 9.4, at 182 (2d ed. 1995); see also MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 50
(suggesting that taperecording the basic information may be an effective and efficient
way of conveying this information). The National District Attorney Association's
National Prosecution Standards recommend a formal orientation program for all victims
and witnesses. Standard 27.1 cmt. (1993).
323. See DAVID BALL, THEATER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR JURY TRIALS 28-30

(1994); MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 51-54; TANFORD, supra note 13, at 261-62;
Applegate, supra note 286, at 299.
324. See BALL, supra note 323, at 28 (advising that witnesses should dress in
clothes they have previously worn even if that requires having them wear the clothes to
a dress rehearsal); LANE, supra note 295, § 11.06, at 12 (explaining that jurors are
offended by witnesses who overdress and may be suspicious of witnesses who dress
"offbeat," and that witnesses should therefore be advised to avoid extremes); MAUET,
supra note 316, at 475 (instructing lawyers to ensure that their witnesses dress in clothes
which are appropriate to their background); MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 51
(explaining that the most important rule is that the witness be clean and neat); TANFORD,
supra note 13, at 262 (suggesting that the lawyer tactfully give advice on how to dress).
325. Many witnesses have mannerisms which could distract the jury from their
testimony. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 51-52. Witness preparation includes
detecting these mannerisms and attempting to eliminate them. See MCELHANEY, supra
note 287, at 51-52. Nevertheless, most commentators caution that a lawyer must be
aware that a witness comes to the trial with certain natural attributes that the lawyer must
work with instead of attempting to eliminate. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 51
("The basic principle is to behave naturally."). On the other hand, one author suggests
that through repetition and rehearsal many habits can be eliminated from the witness's
testimony. See Diane R. Follingstad, Preparingthe Witnessfor Courtroom Testimony,
TRIAL, Jan. 1994, at 50, 50.
326. See KELNER & MCGOVERN, supra note 321, § 8.02, at 8-6 (advising that
witnesses should be instructed to use terms that the jury can "relate to and comprehend").
327. The discussion of demeanor may take many different forms. Some
commentators suggest discussing eye contact and posture with the witness. See BALL,
supra note 323, at 28-29; TANFORD, supra note 13, at 263. Others discuss the need to
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advice they can give witnesses is to tell the truth.32 8 Most general discussions
with the witness about the method of testifying involve little risk of prompting
the witness to distort or falsify evidence.329

b. Divulging Case-Specific Information
Lawyers also impart case-specific information during witness preparation.
For example, the lawyer may explain his theory of the case and how the
witness's testimony fits into the theory. 330 Additionally, the lawyer may discuss
the elements of the claim or charge and facts that tend to prove these elements.33'
Furthermore, some commentators suggest that lawyers discuss the relevant
burden of proof.332 In sum, this method of witness preparation helps the witness
understand the importance of information that the witness may have thought
unimportant or irrelevant.333

advise the witness in more general terms about looking confident during testimony. See
Applegate, supra note 286, at 299. Professor Applegate asserts that some suggested
changes in demeanor can be problematic if they are intended to produce a false
representation of the witness. Applegate, supra note 286, at 299. Professor Kestler
suggests that witnesses must not only tell the truth, but appear to be telling the truth. See
KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.31, at 568. He emphasizes that jurors look to the witness's
demeanor to determine if they are in fact telling the truth. See KESTLER, supra note 286,
§ 9.31, at 568.
328. Professor Kestler suggests that a witness preparation session should begin with
the lawyer explaining that the witness's greatest weapon is to tell the truth. See KESTLER,
supranote 286, § 9.31, at 567; see also LANE, supranote 295, § 11.13, at 16 (suggesting
that witnesses be told not to guess or exaggerate, as such methods are obvious to the
jurors); KELNER & MCGOVERN, supra note 321, at 8-12 (advising lawyers to complement
any vigorous mock cross-examination with vigorous instructions on telling the truth).
Telling the witness to tell the truth is also used as a tactical advantage. Most lawyers
prepare their witnesses for the cross examination question: "What did the lawyer tell you
to say?" The prepared witness simply and sweetly answers: "To tell the truth."
329. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 298.
330. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.33, at 569; see also ARON & ROSNER, supra
note 287, at 229-30 (indicating that, in order to maximize "comprehension and
collaboration," the witness must understand the entire case).
33 1. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.33, at 569.
332. See LANE, supra note 295, § 11.18, at 18.
333. Kestler advises that "[w]itness preparation has the effect of shaping the
testimony, focusing on the significant, dropping the irrelevant, emphasizing helpful
points, and structuring the presentation to minimize the damage caused by adverse
information." KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.33, at 569. Lubet uses the following
hypothetical to exemplify the need to explain to the witness the elements of the case:
"[A] client complaining of a defective product would probably place greatest emphasis
on the way that it malfunctioned; he might not think it important that the salesperson
helped him select it." LUBET, supra note 295, at 46.
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In addition, the lawyer may inform the witness of other evidence and other
witnesses' testimony during witness preparation. One legitimate purpose of this
method of preparation is to explain how the testimony and evidence fit into the
theory of the case. 3 4 Additionally, the witness and the lawyer may discuss
testimony in order to prepare explanations for any inconsistencies.3 35 Finally,
informing336the witness of other testimony may refresh the witness's own
memory.

In contrast to general advice, the disclosure of case-specific information has
the potential to influence the witness to testify falsely. To illustrate, most
lawyers are familiar with the scene from Anatomy of a Murder,337 in which a
criminal defense lawyer, while defending a man charged with murdering his
wife's rapist, explains the significance of the time lapse between the rape and the
murder. The defendant subsequently adapts his story to fit the legal theory.338
Describing the law, theory, and other evidence can encourage the witness to
mold his testimony to fit other aspects of the trial. 339 Additionally, discussing
the necessary burden of proof can "encourage the witness to assert a degree of
certainty that is not otherwise justified.,3 40 Furthermore, supplying information

regarding other evidence and testimony can affect the witness's assessment of
his recollection. For example, the witness may begin to incorporate other
334. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 304.
335. See MAUET, supra note 312, at 475; see also McELHANEY,supra note 287,
at 55 (emphasizing that pre-trial witness preparation, not trial, is the time to discover
inconsistencies).
336. See infra text accompanying notes 392-402.
337. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF AMURDER (1958). See Wydick, supra note
293, at 25 (citing the legal ethics books which discuss the movie scene).
338. Traver explains to the reader the reason for the lecture:
The Lecture is an ancient device that lawyers use to coach their clients so that
the client won't quite know he has been coached and his lawyer can still
preserve the face-saving illusion that he hasn't done any coaching. For
coaching clients, like robbing them, is not only frowned upon, it is downright
unethical ....
Hence the Lecture, an artful device as old as the law itself, and
one used constantly by some of the nicest and most ethical lawyers in the land.
"Who me? I didn't tell him what to say," the lawyer can later comfort himself
"I merely explained the law, see." It is a good practice to scowl and shrug
here and add virtuously: "That's my duty, isn't it?"
TRAVER, supra note 337, at 70.
339. Professor Lubet, using the same hypothetical discussed in note 333, supra,

condemns the following conversation with a client, if it occurred after the client has
indicated he picked out the defective products: "You cannot win this case unless you
testify that the seller assured you a specific level of performance. You need to tell me
exactly how the salesperson induced you to buy, and how you were promised that the
product would meet your needs." LUBET, supra note 295, at 47 n.13.
340. Applegate, supra note 286, at 302. See also Piorkowski, supra note 299, at
404 (discussing the effect of changing the witness's demeanor on the jury's perception
as to the witness's confidence in his or her identification).
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witnesses' testimony as his own and therefore violate evidentiary rules regarding
hearsay and personal knowledge. 34' Additionally, the imparting of other
testimony could cause a witness to become more confident in his testimony than
memory or observations would warrant.342
Although imparting information, both general and case-specific, raises
ethical concerns, the ethical rules only deal with lawyers who knowingly
encourage, aid, or use false testimony.343 The definition of "knowingly" in the
Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct requires "actual knowledge of the fact in

question. 344 Professor Freedman argued that because litigants unavoidably
recreate the event, the advocate should construct a theory of what occurred
which is in the client's best interests. 345 The ethical distinction lies in whether
the lawyer assists the witness in developing the facts, or in creating them; the
former being permitted, the latter prohibited.346 Therefore, lawyers who
unintentionally or unknowingly encourage false testimony are not directly
regulated by the ethical rules.347

2. Preparing the Content of the Testimony
In addition to conveying information, witness preparation entails obtaining
information from the witness and preparing the content of the testimony. The
New York Court of Appeals in, In re Eldridge,34 s observed that the lawyer's duty
in witness preparation is "to extract the facts from the witness not pour them into
him; to learn what the witness does know, not to teach him what he ought to
know. '349 Witness preparation includes discussion of the actual content of the
testimony. Preparation of actual testimony ranges from very general discussion
of the subject matter of the testimony to very precise discussion, including the
choice of words the witness should use in her testimony.

341. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 307.
342. See Piorkowski, supra note 299, at 404.
343. See Piorkowski, supra note 299, at 404; see also supra text accompanying
notes 305-07.

344.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 12.8.6 (1997).
See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM

345.
59-77 (1975); Applegate, supra note 286, at 303.
346. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 303.
347. Professor Lubet suggests that the answer to any witness preparation dilemma
is essentially the intent of the lawyer. See LUBET, supra note 295, at 47.

348. 82 N.Y. 196 (1880).
349. Id. at 206.
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a. GeneralDiscussion of Subject Matters
The most basic reason for witness preparation is that it allows a lawyer to
determine what the witness knows about an event.35° The lawyer can accomplish
this through a general discussion with the witness regarding his perceptions and
recollections of the events. Some commentators believe that a discussion of the
general topics to be included in the testimony, and the organization of the
questions to be presented, is a sufficient and preferable method of witness
preparation.35' Herbert Stem suggested the best way to prepare a witness for
testimony is to assure that he is present during a concise and well-organized
opening statement.352 Mr. Stem asserted that "automatic back and forth from a

350. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 308.
351. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 12.08, at 229-30 (advocating that the
lawyer should give a witness a copy of his or her outline of the direct examination);
HERBERT J. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 168 (1991).
352. See STERN, supra note 351, at 168. The law on permitting witnesses to hear
opening statements is in conflict. See Lane, supra, note 295, § 11.28, at 30; compare
State v. Arroyo, 539 A.2d 581,585 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the sequestration
rule is unambiguous and can exclude any witness during any portion of the trial "in which
he is not testifying"), and Hampton v. Kroger Co., 618 F.2d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that no error resulted from district court excluding the plaintiff's expert witness
from opening statements), with United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1979)
(limiting the sequestration rule to evidentiary hearings), and United States v. Brown, 547
F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1976) ("We do not dispute that a party may request as of right that
witness[es] be excluded prior to the time that any opportunity exists for them to hear the
testimony of other witnesses. We do not, however, construe a party's request for the
exclusion of witnesses prior to opposing counsel's opening statement to be within the
purview of Rule 615. Rule 615 relates exclusively to the time testimony is being given
by other witnesses. It is therefore not appropriate during the reading of pleadings or the
opening address of counsel."). FED. R. EVID. 615 speaks to excluding witnesses during
another witness's testimony. Rule 615 states: "At the request of a party the court shall
order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. FED.
R. EVID. 615. Some of the enumerated purposes for this rule are (1) to assure witnesses
testify from their own knowledge, (2) to prevent the testimony ofone witness influencing
others, and (3) to strengthen the role of cross-examination in testing the testimony. See
Bumblauskas v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, 249 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Ii. Ct. App.

1969). Dean Wignore stated that the exclusionary privilege is "one of the greatest
engines that the skill of man has ever invented for the detection of liars in a court of
justice." Id. (citing 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1838 (3d ed. 1940). Typically, however, a motion for sequestration, or as it is sometimes
referred to, a motion to invoke "the rule," occurs at the beginning of trial, perhaps even
prior to the jury selection, as part of the preliminary matters. See LANE, supra note 295,
§ 11.28, at 30.
FED. R. EvID. 615 does not apply to three categories of witnesses. The court cannot
exclude (1) parties who are natural persons, (2) an officer employee of a party who is not
a natural person designated as its representative, and (3) a person whose presence is
essential to the presentation of the evidence. FED. R. EvID. 615. Category three usually
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/3
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prepared script does not achieve any of the desired purposes of the direct
[examination] (to make testimony clear, memorable, convincing and
'
invulnerable to cross examination)."353
Even practitioners who advocate merely discussing the testimony and not
rehearsing it, suggest that the witness must be assisted in breaking down his
conclusions into specific facts.3" Additionally, some commentators suggest that
during the general discussion, the lawyer should prepare the witness for clues
that the lawyer will give the witness. 5 5 For example, if the witness has forgotten
an item in a list of evidence seized during a search, the lawyer will ask the
witness: "Was there anything else seized?" This question will give the witness
a clue that he or she has forgotten an item.356 Some advocates believe that mere
discussion of the witness's testimony is not sufficient and that rehearsal of the
testimony is imperative. 7
b. Rehearsalof Testimony
The rehearsal of testimony requires that the lawyer and the witness actually
go through the testimony as it will be conducted in the courtroom. This method

refers to expert and advisory witnesses such as law enforcement officers who are
designated as lead investigators. See LANE, supra note 295, § 11.28, at 30. Arkansas
includes crime victims as parties and therefore prohibits their sequestration. See Stephens
v. State, 720 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Ark. 1986).
353. STERN, supra note 351, at 168.
354. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 259.
355. See KESTLER, supra note 286, at 334; TANFORD, supra note 13, at 264. But
see MCELHANEY supra note 287, at 58 (suggesting that, to prevent the witness from
watching the advocate during the cross-examination, the witness should be expressly told
that the lawyer will not provide him any clues).
356. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 264. I suggest to my students that the
question should be asked: "Do you remember anything else that was seized during the
search?" If the witness responds in the negative, then the witness's memory can be
refreshed. Additionally, under FED. R. EvID. 803(7), the proponent may be allowed to
introduce a document that contains a list of seized items as a past recollection recorded,
because the witness has no present memory. Asking the question, without reference to
the witness's memory, could foreclose the use of the document, because the witness will
have testified not that he or she cannot remember, but rather that nothing else was in fact
seized in the search. See LANE, supra note 295, § 11.17, at 18.
357. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 14.01, at 262 ("The rehearsal is an
integral part of process."); CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, § 9.4, at 182
(stating that rehearsal of direct and cross-examinations is vital for first-time witnesses);
LANE, supra note 295, § 11.10, at 14 (advocating that an exact recounting of the questions
to be asked and the answers to be given is fundamental to witness preparation); MAUET,
supra note 316, at 475 (suggesting that the only way to prepare a witness is to practice
the actual examination).
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of witness preparation is helpful in relaxing the witness,"' resolving
inconsistencies in the testimony, and preventing surprises.359 Furthermore, it
may refresh the witness's memory, assuring that nothing is forgotten or
overlooked;3 61 improve the witness's narrative; 36' and help eliminate bad
habits. 362 The amount of rehearsal required may depend on the kind of testimony
and characteristics of the witness.363 Those commentators who advise rehearsal
assert that the rehearsal should be under the same conditions as those under
which the testimony will be given. 364 Additionally, some practitioners advise
that witness rehearsal be videotaped. 365 The videotape can then be used to go
over the testimony and pinpoint problems, including the use or absence of key
words or phrases.366
Some tactical problems arise from the actual rehearsal of testimony. For
example, the testimony can become rote and appear incredible, unemotional, and
unpersuasive.367 In addition, the rehearsal of testimony can eliminate the
36
spontaneity that a conversation has and make the testimony boring.
Furthermore, a witness who has rehearsed testimony may become confused

358. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 14.01, at 263 (noting that the "best
prescription... against anxiety and nervousness" is rehearsal); KELNER & MCGOVERN,
supra note 321, § 8.02, at 8-4.
359. See LANE, supra note 295, § 11.10, at 14.
360. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 14.01, at 262.
361. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 322.
362. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 263.
363. See CARLSON &IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, at 182; KESTLER, supra note
286, § 9.37, at 572 (suggesting that lay witnesses require more rehearsal than experts);
LANE, supra note 295, § 11.03, at 7.
364. See ARON & ROSNER, supranote 287, § 14.02, at 263 (suggesting use of same
lighting, clothing and physical evidence); BALL, supra note 323, at 30-31 ("No doughnuts
and coffee and no jeans."); LANE, supra note 295, § 11.10, at 14.
365. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, § 9.4, at 183; KESTLER, supra
note 286, § 9.37, at 573. The question arises whether the tape recording must be provided
to the opposing counsel in those jurisdictions where the witness's statements must be
given to the opposing side. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 337-38, 352; compare
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 209 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting that counsel is entitled
to interview non-client witnesses in private), with United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d
1070, 1086 (8th Cir.) (holding communications not privileged when the lawyer
encouraged several witnesses to present "a uniform, knowingly untruthful story"), aff'd
h partand vacatedin parton othergrounds en banc,856 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1988), and
United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
conversations dealing with "plans to commit perjury" are admissible);
366. See infra text accompanying notes 372-77.
367. See CARLSON &IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, § 9.4, at 182. But see BALL,
supra note 323, at 31 (explaining that rehearsed does not mean memorized).
368. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 55 (explaining that a direct examination
containing a little "awkward spontaneity is better than one that appears rehearsed");
TANFORD, supra note 13, at 264 (stating that rehearsal interferes with spontaneity).
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during the testimony if the wording or order of the questions changes. 69 Finally,
studies have shown that repeated questioning of witnesses may unduly increase
the level of confidence in their testimony.370 This increased confidence level
may be misleading to the jury. Therefore, repeated rehearsal is a questionable
practice.
Rehearsal as a witness preparation method is considered by many to be an
essential part of pretrial preparation.3 7' However, some attorneys use the
rehearsal not only to discuss particular facts to be covered in testimony, but also
to discuss the use of specific terminology. This method of preparation is the
most troublesome.

c. Suggesting the Use of Specific Words and Phrases
Rehearsal and videotaping can lead the lawyer to suggest the use of
specific words and phrases to the witness. Clearly, there are two areas in which
lawyers may permissibly tell witnesses what words to use. First, a lawyer may
discourage a witness from using prefatory phrases,372 such as "I think" or "to the
best of my knowledge. 373 Such language adds nothing to the fact-finding
mission. Furthermore, exclusion of these phrases does not affect the content of
the testimony. Second, a lawyer may safely instruct the witness not to use
technical language
or jargon.375 The witness should be instructed to use

369. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, § 9.04, at 182 (advising the
advocate not to use exact wording of the questions in order to avoid confusing the
witness).
367. See John S. Shaw, III & Kimberly A. McClure, Repeated Postevent
Questioning Can Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 629, 630 (1996) (suggesting the research shows that repeated police questioning
may increase the confidence of the witness but not necessarily the accuracy).
371. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 322.
372. See Piorkowski, supra note 299, at 399.
373. Early in my career as a state prosecutor, I prosecuted a traffic case in which
my only witness was a Colorado State Highway patrolman. When I asked him to state
his name, he replied: "To the best of my knowledge it is Jim Smith." (I have changed the
name to protect the innocent highway patrolman). I then asked him what his occupation
was, and he replied: "To the best of my knowledge, I am a highway patrolman." The
testimony continued to go from there with the witness prefacing every answer with the
phrase "to the best of my knowledge." Obviously, he had been misinformed that he could
not be tripped up by the cross-examination if he was only testifying to the best of his
knowledge. As a young prosecutor it was an important lesson in the need to warn the
witness against the use of prefatory phrases.
374. See KELNER & MCGOVERN, supra note 321, § 8.02, at 8-6; Piorkowski, supra
note 299, at 400.
375. The famous police jargon that prosecutors always regret hearing is a police
officer's testimony that he "exited his unit" instead of getting out of his car.
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language which the jurors can understand.376 In addition, the witness may3 be
77
instructed on how to analogize to experiences which jurors can understand.
However, this area becomes troublesome when lawyers suggest the use of
specific words and phrases to increase the persuasiveness of testimony, or which
fit the attorney's theory of the case. One commentator suggests that a witness
should be helped with word choices to maximize the "vividness and persuasive
effect of the testimony." 378 Professor Tanford, however, suggests the witness be
given a list of alternative words to chose from, in order to avoid the testimony
appearing incredible or unnatural.379 A famous example of the tactical problem
with giving a witness the words to use is the testimony of a young immigrant girl
named Kate Alterman in the Triangle Shirtwaist fire case in New York.38
Kate Alterman testified for the State in a criminal prosecution against a
company that owned a factory in Greenwich Village. 381 The prosecution
stemmed from a fire which killed hundreds of immigrant workers.382 On direct
examination, it became clear that the words and images used by Kate were not
those of an immigrant seamstress. 383 On cross-examination, the defense counsel,
Max Steuer, asked the witness to repeat the story over and over again.38 4 She
sounded like a recording using the same words and phrases, in the same order.385
Her incongruent use of high flown imagery and crude grammar was a signal that
the account was not her own recollection, but a touched-up version of what she
remembered.386 Professor McElhaney concluded from this story that "too much
time in the shed, and the testimony is bound to smell just a little like a horse. 387
In addition to tactical problems, the lawyer may encounter ethical problems
when discussing word changes with a witness. Obviously, if the word changes
suggested by the lawyer alter the substantive evidence and make the testimony
false, there is an ethical violation. 388 However, the more problematic practice is
the suggested use of words that change the impact, not the substance, of the
testimony. 389 The word suggested may have the same definition as the word

376. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 11.09, at 190.
377. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 260 (suggesting, for example, that witnesses
describe the pain they suffered by analogizing it, for example, to hitting one's head on
a cabinet, burning one's fingers on a hot stove, or hitting one's elbow).
378. MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
379. See TANFORD, supra note 13, at 260.
380. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
381. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287. at 59-60.
382. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
383. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
384. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
385. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 59-60.
386. See MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 60.
387. MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 60.
388. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
389. See Piorkowski, supra note 299, at 400.
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used by the witness, but may not have the same connotation. The line between
definitional changes and changes that merely affect the persuasive quality of the
testimony is not easily ascertained. For example, suppose a witness uses the
word "look" when describing what the defendant did prior to approaching her,
and the prosecutor suggests the use of the words "stare," "glare," or "leer."
Plainly, the prosecutor's words have a more stirring effect. "Stare" connotes a
longer, more continuous activity than look; "glare" infers more menacing
behavior; and "leer" adds a sexual connotation to the testimony. Arguably,
however, none of these words changes the content of the testimony.
The only authoritative source that attempts to deal with this issue is a 1979
District of Columbia Bar opinion. The opinion approved the use of detailed
substantive witness preparation as an accepted part of the trial process. 39 The
opinion also found that a lawyer could suggest the use of specific words and
39
phrases as long as the ultimate testimony remained true and not misleading.
Under that argument, the prosecutor could suggest the more graphic words
described above.
3. Refreshing the Witness's Memory
Finally, an important part of witness preparation is refreshing of the
witness's memory. 392 The lawyer can refresh a witness's memory by different
methods, such as the use of documents and evidence. Also, he can use other
witnesses or witnesses' statements to help jog the memory in preparation for the
witness's testimony.
a. Use ofDocuments and Evidence

Most lawyers suggest beginning any witness preparation by showing the
witness all of the witness's statements, documents, and evidence.393 By showing
the witness her statements, the lawyer can review what the witness has said in
the past and refresh her recollection of the events. Furthermore, this method
protects the witness from being surprised at trial by documents or evidence that

390. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 279; District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics

Comm., Opinion No. 79 (1979).
391. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 279.
392. Attorneys disagree about how much a witness can actually remember and how
much is reconstructed during witness preparation. The amount remembered varies
depending on characteristics of the witness, their ability to perceive at the time of the

event, and the personal impact of the event. See ROGER & JOHN SONSTENG,
PLANNING TO WIN: EFFECTIVE PREPARATION §

ADVOCACY,

1.28, at 19 (1994).
supra note 322, at 182;

393. See CARLSON & IMWINKELRIED,
KELNER &
MCGOVERN, supra note 321, § 8.02, at 8-4 (recommending that the witness's memory
be refreshed before any practice session or simulation); MAUET, supra note 316, at 475.
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she has not reviewed.394 Additionally, this method bolsters the witness's
confidence in her ability to remember. 395 Finally, this method prevents
inconsistencies between the witness's prior testimony and trial testimony.396
Although very few ethical dilemmas arise from refreshing a witness's
memory by utilizing her own statements, there are some tactical considerations.
Most jurisdictions require that any item that is used to refresh a witness's
memory be provided to opposing counsel.397 Therefore, a lawyer using
documents that are not otherwise discoverable should refrain from using those
documents to refresh the witness's recollection.398
bY. Utilizing Other Witnesses or Their Statements
The lawyer can also use other witnesses' statements to refresh the memory
of the witness who is being prepared for trial. In addition to the benefits
discussed above, this method of preparation assists in recognizing and
reconciling inconsistencies in the testimony. 399 However, the lawyer must be
cognizant of the inherent problems with this method of refreshing. The witness
may infer from the lawyer's reference to other witnesses' statements that he
should change his testimony. The lawyer may be suggesting to the witness that
he bring his testimony in line with other witnesses' testimony."
A more controversial method of witness preparation is group preparation.
During a group preparation, all the witnesses to a specific event are prepared
together. This method is considered almost routine in many criminal cases
where prosecutors interview all law enforcement personnel together.
This form of preparation has several advantages. Perhaps the most obvious
is that it saves time. Additionally, this method allows the witnesses to get a clear

394. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 10.13, at 171; KESTLER, supra note
286, § 9.38, at 573.
395. See KELNER & MCGOVERN, supra note 321, § 8.02, at 8-4.
396. See KELNER & MCGOVERN, supranote 321, § 8.02, at 8-4 (suggesting that the
witness be instructed at time of trial to remember what he observed, not what he
previously said, by referring back to incident and not to the making of the statement).
397. FED. R. EVID. 612 requires that, if the court determines it is necessary and in
the interest ofjustice, any evidence shown to a witness during or before trial in order to
refresh their recollection must be provided to the opposing counsel. Some courts have
found that the use of a document to refresh recollection may waive any claims to the
attorney-client privilege. See KESTLER, supra note 286, at 321-22; McELHANEY, supra
note 287, at 54-55; Applegate, supra note 286, at 313.
398. One commentator suggests using summaries prepared by counsel to refresh
recollection and then turning over these summaries to opposing counsel. See CARLSON
& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 322, § 9.4, at 182.
399. See MAUET, supranote 316, at 475; MCELHANEY, supra note 287, at 37.
400. See supratext accompanying notes 334-35.
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picture of the entire case. 40 ' This method is also touted40 2as "the best way to avoid
contradictions among witnesses for the same party.
The ethical pitfalls in this method are plentiful. The lawyer may tell the
witnesses to testify falsely so their testimony is consistent with that of other
witnesses. In United States v. Ebens, 4 3 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a group
meeting between several of the witnesses. 40 The defendants in Ebens were
charged with civil rights violations based on the death of an individual of
Chinese ancestry. 40 5 The witnesses were brought together by a civil rights
activist-a lawyer who was not connected to the prosecution.4 6 The meeting
occurred after the State prosecution had resulted in a guilty verdict,40 7 but before
the case had been tried in federal court. 40 8 During the course of the meeting, the
activist suggested that the witnesses had been brought together to "help each
other remember exactly what happened, how it happened, when it happened, and
all the minor details. ' '4 9 During the meeting, which was taped, one of the
witnesses was persuaded that he had heard racial slurs when he originally had
denied hearing slurs.4 '0 The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court erred in not
allowing the defendants to introduce the recording of the meeting in their trial.41'
Even in cases where the lawyer makes it clear that the witness must tell the
41 2
truth, pressure to conform testimony to eliminate contradiction is enormous.
Unlike the use of statements to refresh, preparing witnesses together can cause
witnesses to be pressured or influenced by other witnesses. One commentator
described a successful use of the group preparation. 3 Three identification
witnesses were interviewed separately before the group session. Two of the
witnesses identified the suspect as having gray hair; one of the witnesses
described the hair as blond. Although the witnesses had been interviewed
separately prior to the group session, during the session the witnesses were able
to convince the third witness that the suspect's hair was gray with no prompting

401. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 14.03, at 263-64.
402. See ARON & ROSNER, supra note 287, § 14.03, at 264.
403. 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986).
404. Id. at 1430.
405. Id. at 1425.
406. Id. at 1430.
404. Because of the public outcry over the leniency of the plea bargain, the
Department of Justice instituted the federal charges. Id. at 1425.
408. Id.. at 1425, 1430.
409. Id. at 1431 n.1.
410. Id.
411. Id. See also United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding group preparation session not privileged).
409. See Applegate, supra note 286, at 351 (concluding that "group preparation
poses extraordinary dangers of collusion, influence and fabrications").
413. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.42, at 580.
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from the lawyer.414 The use of this technique is controversial and dangerous
from a lawyer's perspective.

C. The Prosecutor'sRole in Witness Preparation
The ethical issues surrounding witness preparation are especially delicate
for the prosecutor who attempts to balance her role as a zealous advocate with
her roles as a minister of justice and a quasi-judicial official. More than any
other area of the prosecutor's work, witness preparation highlights the possible
conflict between these roles. 5 As a zealous advocate, the prosecutor, during
witness preparation, acts in her role as a partisan representative. In that role, she
wishes to maximize her chances of winning by preparing the victim to put on the
strongest case possible for conviction.4 61 For the partisan representative within
an adversary system, witness preparation is part of adversarial fact development.
Accordingly, each side to the dispute is responsible for presenting his case in the
best light.4 1 7 The zealous adversary is not concerned with an even-handed
presentation of facts; he seeks to present facts beneficial to his client while
avoiding those which are adverse. 418 The zealous advocate seeks to "put his best
foot forward., 419 To accomplish that end, he must prepare witnesses to present
evidence in a light most favorable to his side of the case.420

414. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.42, at 580.
412. See Piorkowski, supra note 299, at 389 (describing the conflict that most
practitioners face in witness preparation between their duty to zealously represent their
client and to serve as an officer of the court).
416. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.33, at 569 (explaining that it is not the
lawyer's job to "bring all the facts to the attention of the jury," nor is it her "duty to play
an impartial role").
417. See KESTLER, supra note 286, § 9.33, at 569 ("Your emphasis in witness
preparation should be designed to present facts in the light most favorable to your side.");
LANE, supra note 295, § 11.01, at 6 ("It is principally through the direct examination of
their witnesses, that parties truly present and emphasize their cause of action or
defense.").
418. See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the PracticeofLaw, in THE
GOOD LAWYER 170, 174 (David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]

(concluding that "[a] fundamental premise of the adversary system of jurisprudence is
that a competitive rather than a cooperative presentation and analysis of the facts
underlying a dispute will produce a greater number of correct results"); see also Bruce
A. Green, The EthicalProsecutorand the Adversary System, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 126, 130
(1988) (suggesting that the adversary system presupposes that each side bears the
obligation not only to present evidence supporting its case but also ferret out all evidence
supporting his case and contradicting his opponent's case).
419. Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER,
supra note 418, at 150, 153.
420. See KELNER & MCGOVERN, supra note 321, § 8.01, at 8-1 (stating that "[i]t
is the role of the advocate in our legal system to present the client's case in the most
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Although she is called on to be a zealous advocate, the prosecutor must act
within the bounds of the law.42' She must not overtly 422 or covertly attempt to
falsify evidence or suborn perjury. 423 She is prohibited from utilizing false
testimony by the rules of professional conduct and by the Constitution.4 4 The
Supreme Court has consistently
held that the knowing use of false testimony
425
violates due process.

favorable manner within the bounds of the law and the code of ethics").
421. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1997) ("A
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal.").
422. Professor Wydick classifies three grades of witness coaching. He defines
grade one as overt, intentional inducing of witnesses to testify falsely. See Wydick, supra
note 293, at 3. Grade two is defined as coaching in which the lawyer covertly, but still
intentionally attempts to encourage the witness to testify falsely. See Wydick, supranote
293, at 3. According to Professor Wydick, both of these forms of coaching are
prohibited. His grade three coaching involves where the lawyer unintentionally induces
a witness to testify falsely. See Wydick, supra note 293, at 3-4. This Article'suggests
applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to the action of the prosecutor might
constitute grade three witness coaching. There is no need to apply this standard to
blatantly incorrect behavior that not only appears improper, but is improper. Professor
Lubet suggests that lawyers "must explicitly and implicitly prepare their witness to give
his or her own testimony and not the testimony that the lawyer would favor or prefer."
LUBET, supra note 295, at 47.
423. Utilization of the Appearance of Impropriety Standard does not eliminate the
need for the prosecutor to analyze his behavior and motivations to determine whether
they are improper. One commentator laments that, in stressing the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard, government officials may concern themselves merely with
covering up actions so that they appear to be correct. See Morgan, supra note 79, at 611.
Professor Morgan's concern is that concentrating on the "appearance ethic is problematic
because it distracts our attention from its primary referent, motive." See Morgan, supra
note 79, at 619. However, this article suggests that the Appearance of Impropriety
Standard should be applied in addition to considerations of motive and intent.
424. See U.S. CONST. amend. 14 (requiring due process); MODEL RULES'OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1997) (prohibiting fraud in dealing with opposing
counsel); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1997) (prohibiting use of
false testimony or evidence); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1997)
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation).
425. The cases involving the disclosure of false testimony are part of the body of
rules which have been established over the last fifty years concerning the prosecution's
duty to disclose evidence to the defense. See GERSHMAN, supra note 257, § 5.1, at 5-2
(release #11 9/96). The leading case in this area is Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83
(1963). The disclosure rules are sometimes referred to as Brady rules, and include three
specific situations: (1) the use of false testimony, (2) the nondisclosure of materially
favorable evidence upon the request of the defendant, and (3) the nondisclosure of
favorable evidence without a request from the defendant. See GERSHMAN, supra note
257, § 5. 1, at 5-2, 5-3.- Brady dealt with the requirement that the prosecutor disclose any
exculpatory evidence requested by the defendant. Specifically, the Court held that "the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Sixty years ago, in Mooney v. Holohan,426 the Supreme Court held that the
"deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known
to be perjured" is inconsistent with "the rudimentary demands ofjustice.' ' 27 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Pyle v. Kansas, 48 holding that
allegations of the use of perjured testimony by the prosecution were sufficient
to support a claim for release of a state prisoner pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus.42 9 The Court has expanded the principles of Mooney to include the
430
prosecutor's use of false evidence regarding witness credibility.
Additionally, as a minister of justice, the prosecutor must seek not only a
proper verdict but also procedural justice.43' She is held to a higher standard in
this regard.432 Accordingly, when preparing a witness, she must consider the
effects of her actions on the ends ofjustice. Unlike other lawyers, whose sole
goal is to defeat their opponents, the prosecutor must strive for justice and
fairness. 33 This role requires the prosecutor to put the observance of the law
ahead of partisan success.434 Therefore, the prosecutor must not only be
concerned with her intent in witness preparation but also with whether the
resulting behavior of the witness is proper.
The Supreme Court, in Alcorta v. Texas, 435 expanded prosecutorial
misconduct to include testimony elicited by the prosecution which taken as a

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. Subsequent cases have defined what is favorable and material. See, e.g.,
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1994) (requiring the prosecutor to determine
whether the cumulative effect of all the undisclosed evidence is material); United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
426. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
427. Id. at 112. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating
that if a prosecutor uses testimony he should have known was perjured it is fundamentally
unfair to the defendant).
428. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
429. Id. at 216.
430. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
431. Zacharias, supra note 192, at 60. Professor Zacharias calls this "adversarial
justice," referring to the need for prosecutors to refrain from "the use of techniques that
tilt trials toward convictions in an unfair way." Zacharias, supra note 192, at 60.
432. One commentator stressed that "[i]t is important for the courts, scholars, bar
associations and the press to keep reminding prosecutors that they must comply with an
entirely different set of standards than those applicable to the defense bar." LAWLESS,
supra note 258, at xv.
433. Alschuler, supra note 237, at 636 (stressing the need for a double standard,
where the prosecutor refrains from appealing to the emotions of the jury and the defense
attorney uses all lawful tools available to him).
434. See supra text accompanying notes 220-23.
435. 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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whole may give a false impression.436 In Alcorta, the defendant claimed that he
had killed his wife in a heat of passion after coming upon his wife kissing a man
named Natividad Castilleja.437 Castilleja told the prosecutor prior to trial
that he had engaged in sexual intercourse on five or six occasions with the
defendant's wife.4 38 The prosecutor told the witness not to volunteer that
information, but that, if asked, he would need to testify truthfully. 439 During
direct examination of the witness, the prosecutor did not ask about sexual
relations but asked several questions which implied there was merely a casual
friendship between the wife and the witness. 440 The Court held that the
prosecutor's actions violated the principles set forth in Mooney and violated the
defendant's due process rights. 4 '
The prosecutor's duty to be a minister ofjustice requires that she correct
false testimony even if she did not elicit that testimony. 442 For example, in
Napue v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must correct false
evidence that was elicited on cross-examination."3 The witness in Napue
testified on cross-examination that he did not receive promises from the
prosecution in exchange for his testimony.44 However, the prosecutor knew he
had agreed to speak on the witness's behalf in exchange for the witness's
testimony against Napue. 4 5 The Court held the prosecutor's duty not to rely on

436. Id. at31.
437. Id. at 29.
438. Id. at 30-31.
439. Id. at31.
440. The following is a partial transcript of the direct examination:
Q: Natividad [Castilleja], were you in love with Herlinda [the defendant's wife]?
A: No.
Q: Was she in love with you?
A: No.
Q: Had you ever talked about love?
A: No.
Q: Had you ever had any dates with her other than to take her home?
A: No. Well, just when I brought her from there.
Q: Just when you brought her from work?
A: Yes.
Id. at 30.
441. Id. at31.
442. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d
1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991) (declaring that "when exculpatory evidence is withheld,
attention focuses on its effect on the defendant's right to due process; the prosecutor's
intentions are irrelevant").
443. Napue, 360 U.S. at 270.
444. Id. at 265.
445. Id. at 266.
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false testimony applies "when the [s]tate, although not soliciting false evidence,
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." 4 6
The Supreme Court has imposed a duty on the prosecutor with regard to
false testimony that goes beyond that which is applied to the defense counsel.
In Gigilio v. United States,"7 the Court held a prosecutor responsible for false
information elicited at trial which he did not personally know was false." In
Gigilio, a witness testified falsely about the plea bargain he had made with
another prosecutor. 449 The prosecutor who conducted the trial was unaware of
the previous agreement.4 5 The Court reversed the conviction, holding the
government responsible for the false testimony. 451 The Court held: "The
prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the
Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these
purposes, to the Government. 4 52 Accordingly, the prosecutor's duty regarding
the admission of false testimony is the same, "irrespective of the good or bad
faith of the prosecution. 453
The prosecutor's duty as a quasi-judicial official, however, goes further
than prohibitions against the use of false testimony. The prosecutor represents
the criminal justice system to the public, including witnesses and those
observing the case. As previously noted, the legal profession is judged by the
perceptions of citizens who have contact with the system. Witnesses are often
exposed for the first time to the criminal justice system when they are contacted
by the prosecutor to prepare testimony for trial. The prosecutor's actions in
attempting to prepare his case for trial can affect how that witness feels about the

446. Id. at 269.
447. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
448. Id. at 154. See also United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456-57 (2d Cir.
1991) (explaining that "[w]here the prosecution knew or should have known of the
perjury, the conviction must be set aside"), remanded to 788 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); cf United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (noting that "[i]f evidence
highly probative of innocence is in [the prosecutor's] file, he should be presumed to
recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it").
449. See Gigiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1972).
450. Id. at 152.
451. Id. at 154.
452. Id.

453. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). One lower court has interpreted
the prosecutorial requirement to be "when it should be obvious to the Government that
the witness's answer, although made in good faith, is untrue, the Government's obligation
to correct the statement is as compelling as it is in a situation where the Government
knows that the witness is intentionally committing perjury." United States v. Harris, 498
F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974). In Sanders v. Sullivan,
863 F.2d. 218, 226 (2d Cir. 1988), the court held that the state's failure to correct false
testimony violates due process regardless of the prosecutor's participation in the false
testimony.
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system's fairness and honesty. This, in turn, affects the perception of the
criminal justice system by the public as a whole.
Unlike defense attorneys, the prosecutor must be concerned about the
public's perception of fairness as well as fairness itself. The prosecutor, as a
member of the government, must consider both the systemic effects of her
actions as well as their impact on individual cases. Abuses of witness
preparation by the prosecutor can negatively affect the criminal justice system.
Therefore, the prosecutor's role in witness preparation must go beyond partisan
advocacy. It must go beyond a concern merely not to use false testimony. The
prosecutor's duty requires consideration of the appearance as well as the results
of her actions.
D. The Appearance ofImpropriety as the Guide
An Appearance of Impropriety Standard would create a guide to the
prosecutor who is attempting to balance her roles as an advocate, a minister of
justice, and a quasi-judicial official. The professional prosecutor must, of
course, first consider her intentions in utilizing a certain method of witness
preparation. If the prosecutor's conscious intent is to induce false or perjurious
testimony or evidence, the analysis need go no further. The prosecutor clearly
must refrain from violating those provisions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct which prohibit the admission or use of false evidence.
Additionally, she must be alert to actions she may take which would
inadvertently encourage the witness to testify falsely. A prosecutor is prohibited
from inadvertently and unintentionally using false testimony. The rights of the
'4 4
defendant to due process and the duties of the prosecutor "to do justice 1
require the prosecutor to avoid techniques that unintentionally result in false
testimony. However, the prosecutor, in analyzing her behavior, must go further.
Even if the conduct is neither undertaken with an improper intent nor results in
false testimony, the prosecutor must consider whether the method would appear
improper. For example, the prosecutor must consider whether a reasonable
person observing the prosecutor's actions would believe that the prosecutor is
failing to simultaneously conduct herself as a zealous advocate, a minister of
justice, and a quasi-judicial official. A reasonable person would believe that all
three of these roles involve truth-seeking as the ultimate goal. Therefore, if a
prosecutor's actions, when viewed by a reasonable layperson, appear to be
circumventing truth, the actions are improper even though the prosecutor lacked
improper motive. This is true even if the witness was not influenced to testify

454. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[A] criminal prosecution
is not that [the prosecutor] shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .");
MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997) (the prosecution's
"responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice"); Zacharias, supra note 192, at 60.
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falsely. It is helpful to look at three of the methods discussed earlier to ascertain
how this standard would apply to the preparation of witnesses. In applying this
standard, I will discuss the disclosure of case-specific information to the witness
about other evidence, the rehearsal of testimony, and group preparation of
witnesses.
1. Discussing Other Witnesses' Testimony
If one considers only the intent of the prosecutor and the effect on the
witness, the prosecutor may discuss with the witness the total theory of the case
and how that witness's testimony fits into the total picture. As discussed above,
this is helpful in assisting the witness to understand the importance of his
testimony and may assist the prosecutor by alerting the witness to the relevance
and importance of information. The witness, after understanding the relationship
of his testimony to the entire case, may bring information to the attention of the
prosecutor that he may not have otherwise.
However, if the prosecutor discusses other evidence with the witness, the
Appearance of Impropriety Standard may be violated. A reasonable person
watching this exchange might perceive this method to be an attempt by the
prosecution to mold the witness's testimony to that of other witnesses or to
physical evidence. Additionally, the prosecutor could be perceived as
attempting to bolster the witness's testimony by reassuring him that the
testimony is correct. For example, an identification witness will appear much
more confident in her in-court identification of the defendant if she has been told
that other evidence, in addition to her testimony, identifies the defendant. The
Appearances of Impropriety Standard would prohibit the prosecutor from doing
this, although it would not be prohibited by either the current rules of ethics or
constitutional law. The standard would prohibit this method of witness
preparation because it casts doubt on the honesty of the prosecutor and the
integrity of the system. The prosecutor applying this standard would not discuss
with the witness how her testimony fits in with other testimony and clearly
would not discuss other witnesses' testimony.
2. Rehearsal of the Testimony
Many lawyers rehearse testimony with the witness prior to trial. Most
55
commentators agree this is a permissible method of witness preparation.
Assuming the prosecutor does not intend to influence nor, in fact, does influence
the witness to perjure herself, this seems to be a permissible method of witness
preparation.
However, the prosecutor must analyze this method not only from the
perspective of whether she intends to aid or encourage a witness to testify

455. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
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falsely, but also whether this method would appear to be an attempt to subvert
the truth. The pure rehearsal of the direct examination, during which the witness
answers questions by the trial lawyer, does not appear to be an attempt to use
false testimony. The prosecutor appears, by such a method, to properly attempt
to prepare the witness to testify in a clear and coherent manner.456 This method
appears to assist the trier of fact in its "search for the truth ' 457 by helping the
witness testify in an understandable manner.
3. Group Witness Preparation
Finally, in analyzing the method of preparing witnesses as a group, the
prosecutor may be struck by the clear appearance of impropriety. Some
prosecutors may insist that the preparation of a group of witnesses is not
intended to encourage or aid witnesses to mold their testimony to that of the
other witnesses. Furthermore, some might suggest that this method is merely an
attempt to assist witnesses in refreshing their memories by the use of other
witnesses. The argument is that a witness's memory may be refreshed by other
witnesses' statements. Therefore, bringing all the witnesses together is just an
expedient way of accomplishing the same legitimate end.
This method could pass the intent test and maybe even the witness result
test. That is, the prosecutor may not intend to encourage false testimony, and
her methods may not, in fact, cause witnesses to testify falsely. However, if the
prosecutor applies the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to this method, it is
clear this method should be avoided. In seeking to balance her roles as zealous
advocate, minister of justice, and quasi-judicial official, the prosecutor must
analyze how such an action appears to the witnesses themselves and to the
general public. The method sends the distinct message to witnesses that the
prosecutor wishes them to get their "stories straight." This method clearly
appears to a Witness to be an attempt to mold the testimony of all the witnesses
into a consistent story. The prosecutor appears not to want the witnesses to
merely speak the truth, but to tell a compatible story.
Additionally, the public perception of such a method undermines the
integrity of the entire system. A reasonable person observing such a method

456. See Gross, supranote 287, at 1137 (justifying witness preparation as a method

to help the witness not "ramble" or become incoherent during their testimony).
457. Applegate, supranote 286, at 352 n.247. See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 166 (1986) (limiting a lawyer's duty to "conduct compatible with the very nature of
a trial as a search for truth"); In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945) (concluding that

a judgment based on false testimony defeats the "sole ultimate objective of a trial");
Robert H. Jackson, The FederalProsecutor,Address at the Second Annual Conference
of United States Attorneys (April 1, 1940), reprintedin ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
PROSECUTION: ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR 2 (John J. Douglass ed.,

1977) (observing that "[a] citizen's safety lies in a prosecutor who seeks truth and not
victims").
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would also assume the prosecutor is not attempting to obtain the true facts, but
rather to create a version of the facts that will be persuasive in its congruity. The
appearance of such a procedure undermines the public's confidence in the
prosecutor's position as a minister of justice. It therefore undermines the
public's confidence in the process as a whole. Under an Appearance of
Impropriety Standard, this method would be prohibited.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Appearance of Impropriety Standard was excluded from the Model
Rules ofProfessionalConduct because it was considered to be a vague standard
that was inapplicable to lawyers. The standard remains in the Judicial Code,
reflecting a concern that judges represent the system as a whole and must be
both right-acting and right-appearing. Prosecutors, in many ways, hold his same
distinction as representatives of the system. Therefore, prosecutors must be
concerned, not only with the rightness of their actions, but also with the
appearance of their actions. This standard must be incorporated into the Model
Rules ofProfessionalConduct as a special responsibility of the prosecutor. This
standard would require prosecutors to consider, not only their roles as advocates
in individual cases, but also the effect of their actions on the perception and
acceptance of the criminal justice system.
The application of this standard to certain methods utilized by the
prosecution in witness preparation would prohibit some methods due to the
appearance of impropriety. Although witness rehearsal of the evidence would
be permitted even under a more strict Appearance of Impropriety Standard,
group witness preparation and discussing other witnesses evidence would be
prohibited. Criminal prosecutors wield great powers over the lives of others. 458
As one court recognized: "Powers so great impose responsibilities
correspondingly grave. They demand character incorruptible, reputation
unsullied,9 a high standard of professional ethics, and sound judgment of no mean
45
order.

458. As Justice Robert Jackson noted: "The prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty and reputation than any person in America. His discretion is tremendous."
Jackson, supra note 457, at 2.
459. Attorney General v. Tufts, 132 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Mass. 1921).
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